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Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Muslims in the United States were victims 
of increased surveillance by law enforcement on the basis of their religious identity, often 
resulting in mistreatment and unjustified imprisonment. These biases against Muslims 
and subsequent policy shifts have been pervasive and have had negative impacts on the 
growing number of Muslims in the United States. The current study focuses on individual 
differences that predict Islamophobia, including Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), 
Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Nationalism, as well as the specific types of 
intergroup threat perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) and subsequent 
emotional reactions (e.g., anger, fear) that may drive these relationships. Participants (N = 
603) completed a survey measuring SDO, RWA, Nationalism, threat perceptions, 
Islamophobia, emotional reactions toward Muslims, and support for anti-Muslim policies. 
Results demonstrated that higher levels of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism each 
independently predicted more Islamophobia through increased realistic, symbolic, and 
terroristic threat perceptions, respectively. Further, Islamophobia independently mediated 
the relationships between each type of perceived threat and anti-Muslim policy support 
(e.g., Muslim ban), such that those with higher levels of each type of perceived threat 
were more likely to hold Islamophobic attitudes which predicted more support for anti-
Muslim policies. Together, these findings suggest that the susceptibility of individuals 
high in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism to perceive Muslims as threatening influences their 
support for policies related to those ideologies through the activation of perceived threats. 
The emotional components of each type of threat perception and their relation to anti-
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Muslim policy support, however, remain unclear. Potential avenues for improving our 
understanding of the role of emotions in threat-based attitudes and behaviors are 
discussed.   
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In 2015, Islam was identified as one of the world’s fastest growing religions, with 
a global population that is expected to more than double by the year 2060 (Lipka & 
Hackett, 2017). In the United States alone, the Muslim population will increase from 3.45 
million in 2017 to about 8.1 million in 2050 and is expected to exceed the Jewish 
population as the country’s second largest religious group by the year 2040 (Mohamed, 
2018). Increases in the United States Muslim population are largely due to immigration, 
with about 58% of Muslim adults having been born in another country and 18% having at 
least one parent who immigrated to the United States (Pew Research Center, 2017). 
Muslims who immigrate to the United States come from at least 77 different countries 
(Pew Research Center, 2011) within several regions including 35% from South Asia, 
25% from the Middle East, and 23% from other parts of Asia (Pew Research Center, 
2017). No individual country accounts for more than 15% of the United States Muslim 
immigrant population, however, indicating that American Muslims are a racially and 
ethnically diverse group (Pew Research Center, 2017). Despite the growing prevalence of 
Muslims in the United States, 43% of Americans reported feeling prejudiced attitudes 
toward Muslims in 2010, a rate more than double that of any other major religious group 
including Christians, Jews, and Buddhists (Morales, 2010). As recent developments in 
globalization have resulted in religiously motivated conflicts, it is becoming increasingly 
important to understand how intergroup bias impacts the daily lives of members of this 
religious minority group in the United States. 
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Anti-Muslim sentiment and discrimination are not restricted to the general public. 
For example, 28% of Muslims in the United States report being looked at with suspicion, 
and 34% report being singled out by airport security or other law enforcement (Pew 
Research Center, 2011). Overall, 52% of Muslims in the United States feel that anti-
terrorism policies have led to Muslim profiling and increased surveillance. Moreover, 
25% of Muslims in the United States indicate that mosques or Islamic centers in their 
communities have been controversial and another 14% report local opposition to the 
building of mosques and Islamic centers in their communities (Pew Research Center, 
2011). Muslims in the United States have also become the victims of increased 
surveillance by law enforcement following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (e.g., Blackwood 
et al., 2016; Henderson et al., 2006; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Meeropol, 2015). The 
surveillance of Muslims and their communities includes increased questioning by police, 
more arrests, and the insertion of undercover police officers into Muslim-American 
communities and mosques (Ali, 2016; Henderson et al., 2006; Meeropol, 2015). 
Coinciding with increases in scrutiny by law enforcement, a surge in hate crimes toward 
Muslim Americans also occurred in the months following the 9/11 attacks (North et al., 
2014). This trend has continued to climb, such that in 2016, the number of assaults 
against Muslims in the United States surpassed that of 2001 (Kishi, 2017), suggesting 
that there is more to the story than a single event. Increases in anti-Muslim bias and 
Islamophobia have negative consequences for Muslim communities in the United States, 
including feeling less safe in public and reporting lower quality of life as a result of 
perceived religious discrimination (Abu-Ras et al., 2018).  
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In the years immediately following 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), and 18,000 state and local 
police departments across the United States worked in conjunction to arrest individuals 
who fit the profile of the attackers (Henderson et al., 2006; Meeropol, 2015). Specifically, 
Muslims, Arabs, and those from Middle Eastern countries were routinely surveilled, 
questioned, and detained by law enforcement, even in the absence of evidence of terrorist 
activities. Law enforcement agencies were told to treat those arrested as if they were 
terrorists or people who might know terrorists [Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 
2003] even though this widespread abuse of Muslim and Arab communities resulted in 
few terrorism-related prosecutions (Meeropol, 2015). For many, including 762 
individuals detained in New York and New Jersey between the years 2001 and 2002, 
immigration status alone was used as a justification for detainment until proven innocent 
(OIG, 2003). Subsequently, many of these individuals were deported following 
detainment, despite being cleared of all terrorism charges (Henderson et al., 2006; 
Meeropol, 2015). In a speech given at the U.S. Conference of Mayors in October of 2001, 
Attorney General Ashcroft outlined the department’s new focus on intercepting terrorism 
through any possible legal means:  
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa – even by one 
day – we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept 
in custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek 
every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and 
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under the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America (OIG, 
2003, p. 12). 
Under the guidelines laid out by the FBI and the Attorney General, the role of 
state and local police officers was largely to use their street-level positions to surveil 
Muslim and Arab communities and collect intelligence (Henderson et al., 2006; 
Wasserman, 2015). For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) created a 
“Demographics Unit” which attempted to implant an informative in every mosque within 
a 250-mile radius of New York City (Apuzzo & Goldman, 2011; Wasserman, 2015). 
Such informants, often referred to as “mosque crawlers,” would monitor the activities of 
Muslims and mosque services, regardless of any evidence of criminal or terrorist activity. 
In addition to these activities, police officers reportedly monitored which businesses sold 
halal products, which businesses closed their doors for daily prayer, and how often 
Muslim students at universities prayed (Wasserman, 2015). Police officers also tracked 
the racial and ethnic makeup of many of these communities. For example, one Muslim 
client who sued the City of New York for the religious profiling and surveillance of 
Muslims [Center for Constitutional Rights (CRC), 2018] was surveilled for operating a 
grade school for Muslim girls. Police took note of details such that most of the girls 
attending were African American, suggesting that officers were not only monitoring 
Muslim communities but that they believed that their racial and ethnic identities were 
relevant to terrorism-related investigations. Although the main goal of this police 
surveillance was to detect any terrorism-related plans or activity, few terrorism-related 
investigations or charges resulted from the widespread monitoring of Muslims and their 
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communities (Blackwood et al., 2016; Ramirez, 2012). Further, Muslims who were 
eventually cleared of all charges and released from custody often experienced continued 
surveillance by law enforcement in their communities (Ali, 2016; Keeling & Hughes, 
2011). 
In addition to continued surveillance by law enforcement, anti-Muslim bias has 
persisted through the promotion of policies that restrict religious freedom and Muslim 
immigration to the United States. For example, shortly after his election in 2016, then-
President Trump signed an Executive Order that restricted immigration and travel from 
seven Muslim-majority countries including Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and 
Yemen (Trump, 2017a). This Executive Order purported to reduce terrorism through 
restrictions on immigration and travel from majority Muslim nations to the United States. 
Although this policy initially received support from up to 48% of United States 
respondents (Collingwood et al., 2018), the policy quickly became controversial and was 
ultimately revoked as a result of its implementation having violated existing court orders 
(OIG, 2018). The Trump administration persisted by adding other countries to the 
Executive Order that they considered a potential threat to the United States. Still, eight 
out of the eleven countries included in the most recent version of the Executive Order 
were Muslim-majority countries, bringing into question the role of perceived threat in 
this immigration policy decision. 
Biases against Muslims and subsequent policy shifts, such as state-sanctioned 
surveillance, have been pervasive and have greatly harmed the growing number of 
Muslims in the United States (Elsheikh et al., 2017; Meeropol, 2015). Existing social 
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psychological research presents an incomplete understanding of the relationship between 
individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and subsequent emotional reactions 
in the context of prejudice toward Muslims by only investigating one or a few of these 
factors in isolation. Although informative, this research lacks a comprehensive 
understanding of how these factors interact and is unable to assess the relative 
contributions of different ideologies in bias against Muslims. The current study aimed to 
address these gaps by 1) evaluating the roles of individual differences in ideology and 
threat perceptions on prejudice and anti-Muslim policy support, 2) exploring the 
emotional components of different types of threat perceptions regarding Muslims, and 3) 
investigating emotional reactions as mediators in the relationship between threat 
perceptions and support for anti-Muslim policies, focusing on police surveillance of 
Muslims and Muslim communities. 
The current study aimed to understand factors that predict and perpetuate 
prejudice toward Muslims, as well as the implications of such bias for discriminatory 
policies that result in increased surveillance and policing of Muslim and Middle Eastern 
communities in the United States. After discussing the social context and experiences of 
Muslims with Islamophobia in the United States, this paper will discuss several theories 
relevant to understanding bias against Muslims and discriminatory policy support. First, 
given commonly held stereotypes of Muslims as radical and dangerous, social 
psychological theories of intergroup threat (Stephan et al., 2015) and the sociofunctional 
approach to prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) can aid in understanding prejudice 
toward Muslims. These theories suggest that perceptions of threat (i.e., symbolic threat, 
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or threats to one’s values; realistic threat, or threats to one’s resources and power; 
terroristic threat, or threats to one’s physical safety) underlie prejudice toward different 
groups (e.g., religious, racial/ethnic; Stephan et al., 2015). Each specific threat then leads 
to different emotional reactions, such as anger for realistic threats and distrust for 
symbolic threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). These different emotional responses have 
implications for behavioral reactions (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 
2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Schwarz, 2012; Stephan et al., 2015).  
After laying the foundation for the influence of threat and emotion in anti-Muslim 
bias, the role of several individual differences in ideology will be explored, including 
Social Dominance Orientation (i.e., endorsement of existing social hierarchies; SDO; 
Pratto et al., 1994), Right-wing Authoritarianism (i.e., a belief that the norms and rules of 
a society should be followed and enforced; RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), and Nationalism 
(Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Although SDO plays an explanatory role in threat 
perceptions associated with bias against Muslims (Uenal, 2016), incorporating RWA and 
Nationalism may better illuminate the driving forces behind different types of threat 
perceptions given their associations and conceptual overlap with symbolic and terroristic 
threats, respectively (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Kyriakides et al., 2009). Thus, 
understanding the roles of these factors is important for elucidating which mechanisms 
best predict biases and discriminatory behaviors toward Muslims.  
Finally, a deeper review of discriminatory policy support is provided with an 
emphasis on policing policies that rely on religious and ethnic profiling. This discussion 
provides more context to the issues facing Muslims in the United States, such as 
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surveillance of mosques and Muslim communities by local law enforcement. Although 
many have criticized the treatment of Muslim and Middle Eastern communities by law 
enforcement following 9/11 (e.g., Henderson et al., 2006; Wasserman, 2015), 
discriminatory policies against Muslims have received relatively high levels of support 
from the public (Andersen et al., 2012; Collingwood et al., 2018; Saleem, et al., 2017). 
These policies range from those that restrict the civil liberties of Muslims, such as voting 
rights or increased surveillance by law enforcement (Andersen et al., 2012; Saleem et al., 
2017), to those that reduce immigration and increase military action in Muslim-majority 
countries and regions (Collingwood et al., 2018; Saleem et al., 2017). Many of the 
policies regarding increased surveillance and civil liberty restrictions operate on a 
national level which can have broad implications for Muslims’ experiences as members 
of American society. The current study aims to understand several factors which may 
predict support for anti-Muslim policies in the United States. 
Islamophobia in the United States: Definition, targets, and sources 
Some of the earliest uses of the term “Islamophobia” have been traced to the late 
1980s and early 1990s when the term was used to represent discrimination toward 
Muslims (Allen, 2006, as cited in Bravo López, 2011). In 1997, the Runnymede Trust 
developed and popularized the concept of Islamophobia as baseless hostility toward 
Islam and subsequent fear and prejudice toward Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 1997, as 
cited in Lee et al., 2009). Though Islamophobia has broadly been used to indicate 
prejudice and discrimination toward Muslims and the religion of Islam, the specific 
definition of this word has varied in its meaning and scope across time and disciplines 
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(for a review, see Bleich, 2011). For example, while some researchers identify 
Islamophobia as a form of xenophobia (e.g., Sheridan, 2006) or religious intolerance 
(e.g., Geisser, 2003, as cited in Bravo López, 2011), others argue that Islamophobia is 
driven by cultural and religious differences as well as racial identity (e.g., Bravo López, 
2011; Garner & Selod, 2015; Schiffer & Wagner, 2011). Regardless of the specific 
definition used, there is significant evidence suggesting that stereotypes of Muslims and 
Middle Easterners as terrorists fuel anti-Muslim sentiment and Islamophobia (e.g., 
Andersen et al., 2012; Dubosh et al., 2015; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Lee et al., 2009; 
Lee et al., 2013; Saleem et al., 2017). 
Islamophobia stems from bias against Muslims and the religion of Islam, with 
Muslims frequently being perceived as inferior and threatening to Christian and western 
values (Bravo López, 2011; Schiffer & Wagner, 2011; Sheridan, 2006). Islamophobia is 
characterized by a belief that Muslims’ religious beliefs underlie their behaviors and that 
the behaviors and attitudes of a few represent those of all Muslims (Schiffer & Wagner, 
2011). One of the main issues with defining Islamophobia is that it is often unclear 
whether this prejudice stems from one’s religious identity, skin color, or ethnic origin 
(Bravo López, 2011). For example, Islamophobia shares many similarities and 
differences with both racism and anti-Semitism. Schiffer and Wagner (2011) argue that 
Islamophobia may be considered a form of “cultural racism,” in which the religious and 
cultural identity, “Muslim,” is used as a grouping mechanism in place of a racial identity. 
Specifically, the Muslim identity has been racialized such that perceptions of one 
belonging to the group “Muslim” can stem from both physical and cultural characteristics 
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(e.g., skin color, language, clothing; Garner & Selod, 2015). This broader definition of 
race means that even when markers of Islam are not present, Muslim identity may be 
presumed on the basis of other physical markers, such as skin tone. The resulting 
conflation of multiple identities under the umbrella of one group as “Muslims” has led to 
a homogenization of diverse groups of individuals, which has implications for individuals 
that identify as Muslim as well as those erroneously perceived to be Muslim (Wang et al., 
2019). This homogenization is not only present in public discourse, but also in research 
that uses terms like “Muslim” and “Arab” interchangeably (e.g., Echebarria-Echabe & 
Guede, 2007) or uses ethnic identity as a proxy for religious identity (e.g., Adelman & 
Verkuyten, 2019).  
Islamophobia appears to be on the rise in the United States and other parts of the 
Westernized world in recent decades. For example, British Muslims reported 
experiencing more implicit (e.g., microaggressions) and explicit (e.g., exclusory policies) 
discrimination following the 9/11 attacks compared to before (Sheridan, 2006). Implicit 
and explicit attitudes are part of a dual-processing model which consists of both 
unconscious (i.e., without awareness) and conscious (i.e., with awareness) processing 
(Devine, 1989; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Implicit attitudes refer to those that occur 
outside of conscious awareness or control (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995) and are formed over time through repeated exposure to stimuli and associated 
concepts (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Explicit attitudes refer to conscious attitudes that 
involve controlled, conscious processing (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). These attitudes are 
readily available and can be explicitly called to mind and expressed when asked about 
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them. In the United States, people tend to hold more negative implicit attitudes toward 
Muslims relative to Christians, White people, Black people, and people with non-Middle 
Eastern or Islamic sounding foreign names (Gonsalkorale et al., 2009; Nosek et al., 2007; 
Park et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2005). Although explicit attitudes are not always aligned 
with implicit attitudes, particularly for intergroup attitudes (Devine, 1989; Nosek et al., 
2007), Muslims represent a group for which implicit and explicit attitudes are often 
partially aligned (Park et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2005), with explicit negative attitudes 
sometimes being more negative than implicit negative attitudes (Nosek et al., 2007). For 
example, not only is negative affect highest against Muslims compared to several other 
religious groups (i.e., Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Evangelical Christians, Buddhists, 
Hindus, Mormons, and Atheists; Pew, 2017), but research suggests that people are more 
willing to openly express bias against Muslims accused of religiously motivated crimes 
compared to Christians (Miller et al., 2020). Together, these findings suggest people feel 
more comfortable openly expressing negative attitudes toward Muslims, which is 
consistent with the overall support for government-condoned monitoring and surveillance 
of this group. Research suggests that implicit attitudes may exert more influence on 
spontaneous and less controllable behaviors (e.g., body language, fast-paced decision 
making), whereas explicit attitudes may exert more influence on deliberative and 
controllable behaviors (e.g., verbal communication, slow-paced decision making; 
Dovidio et al., 2002). Thus, while implicit attitudes toward Muslims may be more 
predictive of performance on fast-paced decisions, such as shooting decisions (Essien et 
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al., 2017; Unkelbach et al., 2008), explicit attitudes may be more important in predicting 
support for long-term policy implementation (Andersen et al., 2012). 
Perceptions and stereotypes of Muslims are influenced by media portrayals (e.g., 
Kearns et al., 2019a; Kearns et al., 2019b; Shen et al., 2018), which may be many 
people’s only exposure to Muslims or Islam (Pratt, 2011). Terrorism is overrepresented in 
the media compared to the number of deaths it is responsible for, with terrorism receiving 
between 33.3% and 35.6% of media coverage despite terrorism making up less than 
0.01% of deaths in the United States (Shen et al., 2018). Moreover, across all media 
outlets investigated, terrorist attacks receive as much as 357% more coverage if the 
attacker was Muslim compared to other perpetrators of terrorism (Kearns et al., 2019b). 
For major news sources such as CNN and the New York Times, this bias increased to 
758% more coverage. The disparity between the proportion of attacks perpetrated by 
Muslims and the subsequent news coverage is further highlighted by the fact that even 
though only 12.5% of terrorist attacks in the United States were perpetrated by Muslims 
over the last decade, these attacks made up 50% of media coverage of terrorist attacks 
(Kearns et al., 2019b). This overemphasis of Muslim-terrorist stereotypes is particularly 
problematic in light of research suggesting that people are more willing to express bias 
against Muslims who are accused of religiously motivated crimes (Miller et al., 2020). 
Despite contention over the specific definition of Islamophobia and whom it 
applies to, most empirical research has focused on the threat and fear of Muslims and 
Islam (e.g., Bravo López, 2011; Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013; Obaidi et al., 2018; 
Schiffer & Wagner, 2011; Uenal, 2016). Based on previous work establishing the 
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psychometric properties of Islamophobia, the current study defines Islamophobia as a 
fear of Muslims and the Islamic faith (Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013), while also 
acknowledging that implications of this work may extend to those perceived to be 
Muslims. This conceptualization of Islamophobia is comprised of two subcomponents, 
including anti-Muslim attitudes and anti-Islam attitudes, to allow for a distinction 
between negative attitudes and fear felt toward a group (i.e., Muslims) and a religious 
doctrine (i.e., Islam). Although these are two distinct features of Islamophobia that can be 
investigated separately (Uenal, 2016), their strong relation also allows for a global 
measure of Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013).  
To date, research has implicated a number of factors that influence levels of 
Islamophobia and related anti-Muslim attitudes including threat perceptions (e.g., 
Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Velasco Gonzàlez et al., 2008; Uenal, 2016). The 
specific type of threat perception influences affective experiences, which then predict 
behavioral reactions, including whether to approach or avoid a potential threat (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Schwarz, 2012; 
Stephan et al., 2015). Several individual differences in ideology are also commonly 
associated with intergroup bias (e.g., Social Dominance Orientation, Right-wing 
authoritarianism, Nationalism; Altemeyer, 1981; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Pratto et 
al., 1994) and different types of threat perceptions (e.g., realistic, symbolic; Crowson, 
2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017), which may be useful in predicting which kinds of 
people are most susceptible to perceiving Muslims as threatening in different ways and 
how these perceptions may influence subsequent behavioral responses.  
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Intergroup Threat Theory 
Although group living has evolutionarily promoted survival and success for 
humans, it also comes with associated costs and risks, as living within and among groups 
of people inherently means surrounding oneself with others who could potentially cause 
harm to oneself or the group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015). Thus, to 
minimize this risk, humans are attuned to the various threats that others could potentially 
pose. Awareness of potential threats in our environment is thought to serve an 
evolutionary function, as those who are more sensitive to perceived threats in the 
environments would be able to decide on an appropriate course of action to either 
overcome or avoid the threat (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015). Notably, 
threats need only be perceived in order to influence intergroup relations, regardless of 
whether the group in question is actually attempting to shift the status quo in some way or 
enact harm (Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan 
et al., 2015). Accordingly, while from an evolutionary perspective, greater attention to 
threats is adaptive for survival, in terms of intergroup relations, the human predisposition 
to perceive threats may underlie prejudice toward many groups (Stephan et al., 2002; 
Stephan et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2015). Based on research 
emphasizing the role of threat in attitudes toward Muslims (e.g., Uenal, 2016; Wirtz et 
al., 2015), the current study utilized an intergroup threat theory framework in 
understanding what predicts and mediates levels of Islamophobia. 
Conceptualizations of intergroup threat theory (e.g., Stephan et al., 2015) focus on 
three different types of threat perceptions: realistic, symbolic, and more recently, 
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terroristic (Uenal, 2016). Realistic threat perceptions refer to threats to the political or 
economic power of one or one’s group (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; 
Stephan et al., 2015; Uenal, 2016). Symbolic threat perceptions encompass threats to the 
cultural values or beliefs that a group or individual holds (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2015; Uenal, 2016). Terroristic threat perceptions refer to 
threats to the physical safety and well-being of an individual or their group (Doosje et al., 
2009; Uenal, 2016). In early conceptualizations of intergroup threat theory, realistic 
threat perceptions encompassed political, economic, and safety threats (e.g., Stephan et 
al., 2002; Stephan et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Realistic threat perceptions, 
however, may be experienced and expressed in different ways based on context and 
activated stereotypes about a group, which may lead to different affective and behavioral 
outcomes (Stephan et al., 2015). Consequently, realistic and terroristic threat perceptions 
have been delineated from one another to allow for a more comprehensive understanding 
of the contributing factors of threat perceptions and subsequent outcomes (Uenal, 2016). 
Similar to how stereotypes and evaluations of different groups differ in content, 
the nature of perceived threats can vary depending on who is posing the threat and what 
is being threatened in a specific context (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2015). For 
example, White people tend to perceive Black people as realistic threats to their political 
power and social standing, whereas Christians tend to perceive Atheists as symbolic 
threats to their values and worldview (Rios et al., 2018). Threat perceptions tend to be 
positively correlated, however, suggesting that group-based differences in threat 
perceptions may be explained by the context in which one is evaluating threat (Rios et al., 
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2018; Stephan et al., 2015). Specifically, stereotypes are thought to be a primary source 
of threat perceptions, suggesting that an interaction between one’s identity and different 
contexts may activate different stereotypes about that group, which may lead to different 
types of threat perceptions depending on the nature of the activated stereotype (Rios et 
al., 2018). The nature of these threat perceptions may, in turn, predict different attitudes 
and behavioral outcomes (see Figure 1 for theoretical model). 
Figure 1 
Intergroup Threat Theory 
 
Note. Diagram based on Intergroup Threat Theoretical Model proposed by Stephan et al. 
(2015). 
Just as the content of activated stereotypes may influence the type of threat 
perceived, individual differences in ideology tend to be associated with threat perceptions 
related to the content of those ideologies (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2015). For 
example, individuals who prefer societies that are hierarchically organized and who 
desire to maintain the current social order may be more attuned to perceive threats by 
certain groups, especially those perceived to pose realistic threats (Stephan et al., 2015). 
MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY 
 
17 
Additionally, those high in beliefs that a society’s way of being should be maintained 
tend to be more susceptible to perceptions of symbolic threats, which challenge a given 
worldview or certain values (Rios et al., 2018). For example, SDO better predicted 
prejudice toward a fictitious immigrant group when described as threatening economic 
resources, whereas RWA better predicted prejudice when this immigrant group was 
described as threatening cultural values (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Further, for those high 
in RWA, perceived intergroup threat mediated the relationship between a 
multiculturalism prime, which threatened national cultural values, and prejudice toward 
immigrants (Kauff et al., 2017). The social context in which one is evaluating threat can 
also influence levels of each type of threat perception. For example, both immediately 
following the attack of 9/11 and a year later, symbolic threat perceptions of Arab 
immigrants were higher than symbolic threat perceptions of Mexican immigrants, likely 
due to the attacks targeting national monuments (Hitlan et al., 2007). In contrast, 
perceptions of Mexican immigrants as realistic threats increased following 9/11 due to 
the negative impacts of the attacks on the existing economic recession. Similarly, 
following the July 2005 Islamic terrorist attacks on London, terroristic and symbolic 
threat perceptions of Muslims increased, whereas economic realistic threat perceptions 
did not (Abrams et al., 2017). 
Once activated, threat perceptions exert influence on intergroup attitudes and 
outcomes either independently (e.g., realistic threat perceptions only) or in combination 
with one another (e.g., realistic and symbolic threat perceptions; Stephan et al., 2015). 
For example, although both realistic and symbolic threat perceptions contributed to 
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negative attitudes toward Black people, perceived threats to power and resources were a 
stronger predictor of anti-Black attitudes (Stephan et al., 2002). Further, threat 
perceptions influenced levels of support for policies that would impact relevant groups, 
such as immigration, affirmative action, and surveillance to expose terrorist plots 
(Stephan et al., 2015). For instance, people in the United States were more likely to 
support tougher punishment for immigration violations for immigrants who were 
perceived as symbolic threats to American identity (i.e., Mexicans) compared to 
immigrants who were perceived as less symbolically threatening (i.e., Canadians; 
Mukherjee et al., 2013). Threat perceptions are important for understanding and 
predicting behavioral outcomes, as well. Specifically, behavioral responses to intergroup 
threat (e.g., attack, flight, negotiation) are impacted by affective and physiological 
responses to the type of perceived threat, which has implications for many real-world 
outcomes including policy initiatives and individual-level harassment and discrimination 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015). Affective and physiological responses 
will be further discussed in the next section on intergroup emotions. 
Several studies have investigated the role of threat perceptions of Muslims in anti-
Muslim attitudes. In line with intergroup threat theory, which suggests that threat 
perceptions are often correlated and shift in saliency depending on the context, Muslims 
tend to be perceived by non-Muslims as symbolic, realistic, and terroristic threats (e.g., 
Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Obaidi et al., 2018; Raiya et al., 2008; Rios et al., 2018; 
Uenal, 2016). Specifically, Muslims have been perceived as symbolic threats due to 
stereotypes of Muslims as inherently sexist (Moss et al., 2019) and culturally 
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incompatible with the Westernized world (Velasco Gonzàlez et al., 2008) and Christian 
values (Raiya et al., 2008). Although Muslims were perceived as threatening to Christian 
values based on ideological differences between each religion (Raiya et al., 2008), 
Muslims can be perceived as symbolic threats by the general public, as well. For 
example, in the context of the Netherlands, stereotypes about Muslims as threats to 
national values and culture were often emphasized over stereotypes of Muslims as 
threatening resources and power (Velasco González et al., 2008). Accordingly, Muslims 
were perceived by participants as more symbolic threats than realistic threats in this 
national context.  
Muslims are also perceived as terroristic threats in accordance with stereotypes of 
Muslims as extremists or terrorists (e.g., Ekman, 2015; Fischer et al., 2007; Uenal, 2016). 
Support for this stems from investigations of the role of realistic threats in anti-Muslim 
attitudes which focused on perceived safety, rather than power or economic threats (e.g., 
Ciftci, 2012; Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008). For example, although Ciftci (2012) found 
that stereotypes and attitudes toward Muslims were driven by perceptions of Muslims as 
symbolic and realistic threats, their operationalization of realistic threats focused on 
safety threats related to terrorism, which parallels current conceptualizations of terroristic 
threat perceptions. In some contexts, however, Muslims also elicit perceptions of political 
and economic realistic threat perceptions. For instance, voting intentions for the United 
Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) were predicted by perceptions that 
Muslims threaten cultural values (i.e., symbolic threats) as well as economic well-being 
and political power (i.e., realistic threats; Swami et al., 2018). 
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Although past research illuminates the complexity of threat perceptions and 
attitudes toward Muslims, few studies have investigated each of these threat perceptions 
simultaneously, often focusing on one or two threats in isolation instead. Of the studies 
investigating all three threat perceptions concurrently (i.e., symbolic, realistic, terroristic), 
levels of each threat perception toward Muslims exist but are influenced by several 
factors (Obaidi et al., 2018; Uenal, 2016). For example, one study found that realistic, 
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions each mediated the relationship between SDO 
and Islamophobia (Uenal, 2016). Specific to policy support, Norwegians’ intentions to 
support anti-Islamic movements were best predicted by symbolic threat perceptions 
(Obaidi et al., 2018). These effects were also driven in part by realistic threat perceptions 
but not terroristic threat perceptions, likely a result of the cultural context in which there 
was no recent or imminent threat of Islamic extremist terrorism at the time of the survey 
and emphasis on cultural incompatibility in Norway’s social discourse (Obaidi et al., 
2018). Still, more work is needed to better understand the complexities of perceptions of 
Muslim threat and subsequent anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support, which the 
current study aimed to address. 
Overall, these findings indicate the existence of a complex relationship between 
the socio-political context and threat perceptions toward Muslims, who may be perceived 
as threatening in different ways depending on the nature of salient stereotypes. Different 
types of threats may further have implications for policy support, as research suggests 
that changes in support for discriminatory policies are influenced by the nature of 
perceived threats (Rios et al., 2018). For example, while priming symbolic threat 
MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY 
 
21 
perceptions influenced support for policies that would impact homosexuals, a group 
perceived as threatening traditional family values, it did not influence support for policies 
regarding welfare recipients, a group perceived as threatening economic resources 
(Brambilla & Butz, 2013). The differential impact of threat perceptions on policy support 
may be driven by more than just content compatibility, however, as research suggests that 
threat perceptions beget different emotional reactions that impact attitudes and behavior 
in various ways (e.g., Wirtz et al., 2015). 
The Role of Emotion in Intergroup Bias 
Emotions refer to relatively short-lived affective responses and feelings that are 
typically evoked by a known cause (Schwarz, 2012), such as perceived threats (Brown & 
Hewstone, 2005; Stephan et al., 2015), and have the power to influence information 
processing, judgment, and decision making (Clore et al., 2000). Affective responses are 
considered a source of information about the environment that indicate the appraisal of a 
target stimulus and impact subsequent evaluations and behaviors (Brown & Hewstone, 
2005; Clore et al., 2000; Schwarz, 2012). Specifically, emotions can act as indicators of 
whether to engage in certain behaviors with the goal of maintaining, decreasing, or 
increasing the current emotional response or a desired emotional response (Barrett et al., 
2007). Affective appraisals are ongoing as individuals are nearly always receiving 
affective cues from their social surroundings at both conscious (e.g., cognitive) and 
unconscious (e.g., perceptual) levels of awareness (Clore et al., 2000). Importantly, the 
affective responses that guide behaviors are part of an individual’s subjective construal of 
situations, suggesting that the influence of intergroup emotions on behavioral outcomes 
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may be driven by stereotypes and perceptions of a group rather than objective 
information in a given environment (Tapias et al., 2007). 
 Emotional responses to a member of a particular group can occur at two different 
levels. Specifically, emotions can be situationally constrained in which an episodic 
instance or interaction elicits an emotion, or more chronically felt in which the salience of 
the group category elicits an emotion (Kauff et al., 2017). Although both types of 
intergroup emotional responses are important for understanding intergroup relations, 
more chronically felt intergroup emotions better predict behavioral tendencies toward 
different groups both directly and as a mediator between episodic intergroup emotions 
and behavioral tendencies (Kauff et al., 2017). Therefore, chronic emotional responses to 
different groups may be particularly relevant for global outcomes of threat appraisals, 
such as discriminatory policy support, due to their broad, sweeping nature and their 
impact on behaviors toward the entire group. 
 Emotions are thought to have evolved in order to alert individuals to potential 
threats that require attention which suggests that threat perceptions and emotions are two 
components of a single detection system (Clore et al., 2000; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Schwarz, 2012). The sociofunctional approach to prejudice posits that different emotional 
responses arise systematically from distinct threat perceptions (e.g., realistic, symbolic, 
terroristic; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Schwarz, 2012; Stephan et al., 2015). For example, 
higher perceptions of realistic threats predicted feelings of anger whereas higher 
perceptions of safety threats predicted feelings of fear (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
Further, Atheists, a group perceived as a symbolic threat by Christians, elicit feelings of 
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moral disgust and distrust which are driven by stereotypes of Atheists as immoral (Cook 
et al., 2015; Gervais et al., 2011; Gervais, 2014). Together, these findings suggest that 
different types of threat perceptions, such as threats to one’s resources or threats to one’s 
values, elicit different emotional responses that vary according to the content of the threat 
at hand. 
The nature of emotional reactions has important implications for behavioral 
outcomes in response to specific threat perceptions (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001; Schwarz, 2012; Stephan et al., 2015). For instance, anger is associated 
with riskier approach tendencies in response to threat (e.g., aggressive confrontation), 
whereas fear is associated with less risky avoidance tendencies in response to threat (e.g., 
withdrawal from a situation; Cook et al., 2018; Kauff et al., 2017; Lerner & Keltner, 
2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Mackie et al., 2000; Schwarz, 2012). These differences in 
behavioral responses are likely driven by differences in one’s appraisal of their level of 
control and certainty regarding the threat at hand. Specifically, anger indicates more 
certainty and control whereas fear indicates less certainty and control (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001). Thus, despite both emotional responses being high in negative valence and arousal 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), the nature of the underlying threat and 
subsequent emotion can result in different behavioral responses that can have important 
implications for Muslims’ intergroup experiences in the United States. To illustrate, 
individuals who perceive Muslims as terroristic threats may take extra precautions to 
avoid Muslims or vote to enact policies that would restrict immigration from Muslim-
majority countries. 
MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY 
 
24 
 Investigations of the roles of emotions in attitudes toward Muslims also suggest 
that emotions mediate the relationships between perceived threats and behavioral 
outcomes. For example, perceptions of Muslims as symbolic threats predicted both social 
distancing intentions as well as political intolerance (i.e., support for anti-Muslim 
policies), but these effects were mediated by different emotions (Wirtz et al., 2015). 
Specifically, the relationship between perceived symbolic threat and social distancing 
intentions was mediated by disgust and pity, whereas anger mediated the relationship 
between perceived symbolic threats and political intolerance toward Muslims. This is 
consistent with the idea that disgust is associated with avoidance behaviors, while anger 
is associated with behaviors aimed at correcting a perceived injustice or removing a 
source of frustration (Mackie et al., 2000; Nabi, 2002; Wirtz et al., 2015). Intergroup 
disgust sensitivity, or the tendency to respond to minority groups with disgust (Choma et 
al., 2012; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Hodson et al., 2013), also differentially predicted 
levels of Islamophobia (Choma et al., 2012). This effect was strengthened by 
dispositional or chronic fear toward Muslims, suggesting that various threat perceptions 
and emotions can interact, potentially compounding the impact of emotions on behavioral 
responses. For example, as both fear and disgust predict avoidant behaviors, it is possible 
that the combination of these two emotions would exacerbate the tendency to avoid 
certain groups of people, such as Muslims. These findings also suggest that individual 
differences in the tendency to perceive certain groups of people as threatening in specific 
ways are important in understanding attitudes and behavioral reactions toward those 
groups.   
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Individual Differences in Ideology as Predictors of Prejudice 
 Social psychology has identified many individual differences in personality and 
ideology that can predict intergroup attitudes, including Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO; Pratto, et al., 1994), Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), and 
Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). In addition to the predictive validity of each 
of these constructs for intergroup outcomes and support for policies that impact 
intergroup relations, the relevance of these specific individual differences in ideology for 
the current study lie in their associations with different types of threat perceptions. Thus, 
the roles of individual differences in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism in intergroup relations 
and threat perceptions were delineated both separately and in combination with one 
another. 
Social Dominance Orientation 
Social dominance theory posits that social systems are inherently organized into 
group-based hierarchies with at least one dominant social group, often a racial, religious, 
or national group (Sidanius et al., 1994). Dominance within social systems is maintained 
through both individual and structural factors which perpetuate a caste-like system in 
which the dominant group holds a disproportionate amount of social power and value 
(Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004). SDO represents an 
individualized preference for hierarchically arranged social structures in which some 
groups are dominant while others are subordinate (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 
1994). SDO may be further broken down into two subcomponents, one which indicates a 
preference for forcefully oppressing lower status groups (i.e., Dominance; SDO-D) and 
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the second involving the utilization of subtler hierarchy-enhancing policies (i.e., 
Egalitarianism; SDO-E) in order to maintain group-based dominance (Ho et al., 2015). In 
some contexts, each component of SDO may predict different attitudes. For example, 
SDO-D better predicted support for Trump in the 2016 presidential election than SDO-E 
(Womick et al., 2018). Although the subcomponents of SDO are sometimes examined 
separately in this way, most work investigates these components together in a single 
composite scale (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Pratto et al., 1998).  
In general, White individuals and men both tend to be higher in SDO (Pratto et 
al., 1994; Pratto et al., 1998; Sidanius et al., 1994). Those who are higher in SDO tend to 
support hierarchy-enhancing policies and take hierarchy-enhancing roles, which 
contribute to maintaining hierarchical social structures (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius et al., 
1994). Conversely, individuals lower in SDO tend to lean toward hierarchy-attenuating 
policies and roles, which contribute to creating equality in the social structure. For 
example, police officers (a hierarchy-enhancing role) tended to be higher in SDO than 
public defenders (a hierarchy-attenuating role), even when controlling for differences in 
demographics such as gender, education, and social class (Sidanius et al., 1994). Socially 
dominant attitudes and support for hierarchy-enhancing policies largely stem from 
legitimizing myths, which justify the need for policies that reinforce existing social 
structures (Pratto et al., 2006). For example, SDO predicted support for increased military 
spending, support for war, and opposition for increased funding for social welfare (Pratto 
et al., 1998). Further, each of these relationships was mediated by several legitimizing 
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myths such as conservatism, which legitimizes wealth inequality through the promotion 
of capitalism.  
SDO may indicate behavioral predispositions, as it is a relatively stable predictor 
of intergroup attitudes and support for policies that directly impact subordinate groups 
(e.g., Pratto et al., 2006; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2004). 
For example, it could be that perceptions of Muslims as immigrants who threaten the jobs 
and economic prosperity of Americans serve to legitimize the perceived need for policies 
that reduce immigration from Muslim-majority countries. Accordingly, higher levels of 
SDO were related to perceived threats of Muslims by non-Muslims (Dunwoody & 
McFarland, 2018). Relationships between SDO and intergroup attitudes were driven in 
part by perceived competition with other groups, which may be conceptually related to 
realistic threat perceptions (Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Perry et al., 2013). Consequently, 
the current study aimed to examine the predictive validity of SDO in realistic threat 
perceptions, as well as subsequent anti-Muslim attitudes and support for anti-Muslim 
policies.  
Right-wing Authoritarianism 
 Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is a multidimensional individual difference 
construct that refers to one’s preference for social order and obedience to authorities 
(Altemeyer, 1981; Mallinas et al., 2019; Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007; Smith & 
Winter, 2002). RWA consists of several components including RWA submission, RWA 
aggression, and RWA conservatism (Altemeyer, 1981; Johnson et al., 2012; Manganelli 
Rattazzi et al., 2007). RWA submission encompasses the belief that authority figures in 
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society should be obeyed. RWA aggression refers to beliefs that those who violate rules 
imposed by society’s authority figures should be punished. RWA conservatism includes 
beliefs that a society’s traditional values should be upheld. RWA is often considered as a 
moralization of a given society, meaning that cultural norms and values are seen as 
correct and true, and at times, requiring reinforcement. In particular, the conservatism 
component of RWA has been shown to align with other constructs relating to violations 
of one’s fundamental beliefs about the world (e.g., morality, religious fundamentalism; 
Johnson et al., 2012; Mallinas et al., 2019), suggesting that this construct may be useful 
in predicting attitudes toward groups perceived as violating cultural and societal norms 
and values. Accordingly, research suggests that RWA is associated with implicit and 
explicit prejudice toward a number of groups including Muslims and Arabs (Johnson et 
al., 2012; Rowatt et al., 2005), as well as attitudes surrounding social policies (Wilson & 
Sibley, 2013) and police use of force (Gerber & Jackson, 2017). Specifically, research 
suggests that those high in RWA tend to be more supportive of conservative policies 
(e.g., restricting abortion, disenfranchising labor unions) and more supportive of war 
(Wilson & Sibley, 2013).  
Although conceptually related in many ways, SDO and RWA are distinct 
constructs that can predict different outcomes (e.g., Gerber & Jackson, 2017; Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2017; Pettigrew, 2017). For example, SDO and RWA accounted for a 
substantial amount of the variance in prejudice toward Black people, women, and 
homosexuals, despite moderate correlations between the constructs (Altemeyer, 1998 as 
cited in Reynolds et al., 2001). Additionally, SDO and RWA may differentially predict 
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support for police use of force based on the level of force used. Specifically, while SDO 
predicted support for reasonable use of force by police, RWA predicted support for 
excessive use of force by police, presumably due to increased levels of trust in the 
ingroup’s authority figures (Gerber & Jackson, 2017). In certain contexts, however, SDO 
and RWA appear to have both interactive and additive effects on one another (e.g., 
Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2006; Osborne et al., 2017; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). For example, 
very low levels of SDO and RWA predicted liberalism, reflecting their interactive effects 
on one another (Wilson & Sibley, 2013). Very high levels of SDO and RWA, however, 
predicted conservatism, reflecting the additive effects of each individual difference 
(Wilson & Sibley, 2013). The nature of the effects of these constructs on one another 
may be in part due to identity salience and relevance in a specific context. 
In terms of threat perceptions, complementary patterns to the relation between 
SDO and realistic threat perceptions emerge between RWA and symbolic threat 
perceptions. For example, the relationship between RWA and support for stricter 
immigration laws was mediated by perceptions of cultural threat, whereas the relationship 
between SDO and support for stricter immigration laws was mediated by perceived 
competition (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Consistent with this pattern, RWA also 
predicted support for ethnic persecution when participants were primed with immigrant 
targets who failed to assimilate to national ingroup norms, presumably representing 
threats to social values (Thomsen et al., 2008). Conversely, SDO predicted support for 
ethnic persecution when participants were primed with immigrant targets who 
successfully assimilated to national ingroup norms, presumably representing a threat to 
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one’s standing in the social hierarchy as more people successfully enter a given society. 
Together, these findings suggest that different individual differences in ideology may be 
more or less relevant in perceiving different types of threats. RWA may be particularly 
important for understanding support for discriminatory policing policies regarding 
Muslim surveillance. For instance, those who are high in RWA may be more likely to 
perceive certain groups as threatening their cultural values and social order, as well as 
being more willing to allocate resources to enforcing societal norms through policing 
practices such as surveillance. Thus, the current study also aimed to elucidate the role of 
RWA in symbolic threat perceptions as well as subsequent anti-Muslim attitudes and 
policy support. 
Nationalism 
 Nationalism is a feeling of belonging to a particular nation accompanied by 
beliefs that one’s nation is superior to others and a desire to maintain national purity 
(Dekker et al., 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Zmigrod et al., 2018). This specific 
national attitude differs from related constructs such as patriotism, which represents 
feelings of attachment to one’s nation, or national identity, which represents 
identification as a member of one’s nation (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Unlike 
patriotism and national identification, Nationalism is characterized by the promotion of 
rigid national exclusionism to the detriment of other nations or those perceived to belong 
to other nations (Dekker et al., 2003; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kosterman & Feshbach, 
1989; Osborne et al., 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2018). This type of nationalistic exclusionism 
tends to lead to negative intergroup attitudes and interactions which differ from the 
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effects of patriotism (Ayub & Jehn, 2010). For example, Nationalism, but not patriotism, 
predicted support for military nuclear armament (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), as well 
as a preference for national cultural goods over international goods (Meuleman et al., 
2013). Nationalism may be particularly relevant in understanding attitudes toward 
Muslims in the United States, as those who are Muslim tend to be perceived as “insider 
enemies” who must prove their loyalty to their western identity above and beyond that of 
their religious or ethnic identities (Poynting & Mason, 2007). Those high in Nationalism 
may be more susceptible to perceiving threats to their national identity, and thus, more 
supportive of xenophobic and anti-Muslim political platforms (Kende & Krekó, 2020). In 
line with these findings, flag-display behaviors, which are typically thought to represent 
patriotic attitudes and often occur following major national events such as the 9/11 
terrorist attacks (Skitka, 2005), actually led to increased Nationalistic rather than patriotic 
attitudes (Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008). Together, these findings suggest that 
Nationalism may play a role in negative attitudes toward Muslims who are often 
perceived as not belonging to western national groups (e.g., Bravo López, 2011; Dubosh 
et al., 2015). 
 Nationalism is also conceptually related to RWA and SDO. Not only has RWA 
aggression positively related with Nationalism (Todosijevic, 1998), but SDO and RWA 
each moderately predicted Nationalism and support for military aggression (Crowson, 
2009). Additionally, a longitudinal study in New Zealand found that SDO and RWA 
predicted Nationalism over time, with no longitudinal effect of Nationalism on SDO and 
RWA (Osborne et al., 2017). Still, the independent role of Nationalism as a distinct 
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predictor of intergroup attitudes is evident. Specifically, SDO, RWA, and Nationalism 
each independently predicted support in the decision for the UK to leave the EU, and 
these relationships were mediated by the perceived threats of immigrants in the UK 
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). Despite items measuring each type of threat perception 
(i.e., realistic, symbolic, and terroristic), these studies aggregated their threat perception 
items into a single scale, potentially obscuring the nuances in the relationships between 
individual differences and discrete threat perceptions. Further, much of the current work 
on the consequences of Nationalistic attitudes for Muslims exists in contexts outside of 
the United States, leaving the question open of how these attitudes impact outcomes for 
Muslims in the specific political context of the United States. 
Although each of these individual differences in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, 
Nationalism) and threat perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) have not 
previously been investigated concurrently (as is the goal of the current study), there is 
robust evidence that SDO, RWA, and Nationalism are related to threat perceptions in 
fundamentally different ways. Specifically, the effect of several of these constructs on 
intergroup attitudes and outcomes is mediated through perceptions of threat by relevant 
groups (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Crowson, 2009; Perry et al., 2013). For example, 
not only was RWA more strongly associated with perceptions of terrorists as symbolic 
threats than realistic threats, but RWA was also a better predictor of symbolic threat 
perceptions than SDO (Crowson, 2009). This is unsurprising considering that the nature 
of symbolic threats (i.e., threats to one’s values or worldview) are highly relevant for 
individuals high in RWA who wish to maintain the traditional norms and values of their 
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society and culture. Further, although less empirical evidence currently exists 
investigating the relationship between Nationalism and SDO with perceived threats, these 
individual difference constructs map onto terroristic and realistic threat perceptions, 
respectively. For example, research suggests that Nationalism is strongly associated with 
perceptions of the national ingroup as ethnically and culturally homogenous (e.g., 
Kyriakides et al., 2009; Molina et al., 2014; Yogeeswaran et al., 2019) and that Muslims 
are often perceived as immigrants and terrorists (e.g., Andersen et al., 2012; Dubosh et 
al., 2015; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Noor et al., 2019). Together, this may hold 
implications for the role of Nationalism in predicting threat perceptions toward Muslims 
who may be perceived as a greater threat to public safety by someone who is predisposed 
to be concerned with national superiority and purity (i.e., someone high in Nationalism). 
Additionally, consistent with research that suggests that those high in SDO may be 
particularly sensitive to perceived competition with other groups (Craig & Richeson, 
2014b; Thomsen et al., 2008), it is likely that these individuals are also more susceptible 
to other forms of perceived threats to the social hierarchy, such as their ingroup’s social 
standing and power within that hierarchy. Such concerns are often associated with issues 
of power and status in society which are conceptually related to realistic threat 
perceptions that center around economic well-being and political power (a form of social 
power; Uenal, 2016). These findings suggest that different individual differences in 
ideology may increase susceptibility to ideological-specific threats. For example, those 
who are high in SDO, and thus value the existing social power structure in society, may 
be particularly attuned to threat to that power structure (i.e., realistic threat). Taken 
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together, the current study aimed to understand how individual differences in ideology 
may differentially predict attitudes toward Muslims and subsequent policy support 
through specific types of threat perceptions. 
Anti-Muslim Bias in Policing and Policy 
As mentioned previously, several anti-Muslim policies have been proposed and 
implemented in the years since 9/11, including increased surveillance (Apuzzo & 
Goldman, 2011a; 2011b; Apuzzo et al., 2011), decreased immigration from Muslim-
majority countries (Collingwood et al., 2018; Elsheikh et al., 2017), and the prohibition 
of Sharia law in the United States (Elsheikh et al., 2017). Many of these policies are 
rooted in stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists and a rising tide of Islamophobia (e.g., Lee 
et al., 2009; Lee, et al., 2013), which has resulted in non-empirically supported policing 
practices that characterize Muslims and their communities as a suspect class of citizens 
that necessitate extra inspection (Ali, 2016; Elsheikh et al., 2017). As each previous 
section has described, threat perceptions, emotions, and individual differences influence 
intergroup attitudes and related policies. The goal of the current section is to outline 
previous research implicating each of these factors in support for policies that 
disproportionately impact minority groups. After laying this foundation, research on 
support for anti-Muslim policies will be delineated in order to provide context and 
direction for the specific policy items considered in the current study. 
Threat perceptions can influence policy support in different ways depending on 
the type of threat perceived and social context. For example, exposure to multiculturalism 
(Morrison et al., 2010) and increasing national diversity (Craig & Richeson, 2014a) can 
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increase both realistic and symbolic threat perceptions, which subsequently predict 
support for more conservative foreign, economic, and social policies that would reduce 
the perceived threat of increasing diversity and multiculturalism (Osborn et al., 2019). 
Moreover, exposure to increasing diversity in the United States predicted support for 
Trump in the 2016 presidential election through increased realistic threat perceptions 
(Osborn et al., 2019). These findings suggest that threat perceptions may influence 
individuals’ support for policies and politicians whose goals align with reducing the 
perceived threat. Accordingly, participants who were presented with a news release 
indicating that the Hispanic population in the United States will outnumber the White 
population by the year 2042 showed increased support for Trump in the 2016 presidential 
election and anti-immigrant policies as well as more opposition to political correctness 
norms, all of which were mediated by perceived realistic threats to their group status 
(Major et al., 2018).  
Emotions are relevant in understanding reactions to threat perceptions and 
subsequent policy support. Recall that, according to the sociofunctional approach, 
emotions can be a result of perceived threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), which can 
predict different types of evaluations and behaviors (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001). For instance, while fear is associated with avoidance tendencies, anger is 
associated with approach tendencies. These evaluations and behaviors can extend to 
outcomes such as policy support and voting intentions, as well. For example, in a sample 
of Americans, inducing fear about future threats by those responsible for the attacks of 
9/11 led to increased support for policies aimed at preventing terrorism (Lerner et al., 
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2003). Conversely, inducing anger by presenting participants with images of celebrations 
of the 9/11 attacks by people in Arab countries led to increased support for more punitive 
policies such as deportation. Further, in support of the sociofunctional approach, 
emotions appear to mediate the relationship between perceived threat and policy support. 
For example, in the Netherlands, those who reported higher levels of perceived symbolic 
threat by Muslims also reported higher feelings of anger and disgust when thinking about 
Muslims (Wirtz et al., 2015). Only anger, however, predicted support for the restriction 
of Muslim immigration and religious rights, such as wearing religious clothing in public 
and building local mosques. Disgust, on the other hand, predicted preferences for 
maintaining social distance from Muslims. These findings support the importance of 
understanding the role of both perceived threats and emotional evaluations in predicting 
attitudes toward Muslims and subsequent anti-Muslim policy support. 
 Individual differences in ideology also play a role in support for different policy 
measures both in isolation and in combination with threat perceptions and emotions. For 
instance, while SDO and RWA both predict similar outcomes, such as support for 
increased military spending and military action against terrorists (Crowson, 2009; Pratto 
et al., 1998), they may operate through different perceived threats. Consistent with 
intergroup threat theory, the relationships between SDO and RWA with support for 
stricter immigration laws were mediated by perceived realistic and symbolic threats, 
respectively (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Further, SDO predicted support for stricter 
immigration through perceived realistic threat regardless of whether the national context 
was in their home country (i.e., United States) or some other country (i.e., Singapore). 
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RWA, however, only predicted support for stricter immigration through perceived 
realistic threat in the context of their home country, presumably because it was difficult 
for participants to empathize perceived symbolic threat with an outside nation that could 
itself present a symbolic threat to their ingroup (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Nationalism 
is also positively related to support for policies in important ways. Higher levels of 
Nationalism, for instance, predicted increased support for policies to punish 
undocumented immigrants, but not to punish the citizens who illegally hire them 
(Mukherjee et al., 2012). Further, this effect was strongest for those who held a cultural 
construction of American identity characterized by citizenship and the ability to speak 
English, suggesting that support for this policy may have been driven by perceived 
threats by immigrants. Thus, for those high in Nationalism, support for some policies 
may be based more on ethnocentrism and perceived threat by immigrants than their 
purported concern for law and order. Together, this research suggests the importance of 
considering multiple factors in understanding what predicts prejudice toward Muslims 
and subsequent policy support that can have very real impacts on the lives of Muslims 
residing in the United States.  
 As previously described, Muslims in the United States have been subject to 
increased surveillance and investigation since the attacks of 9/11 by both federal and 
local law enforcement (e.g., Henderson et al., 2006; Meeropol, 2015; OIG, 2003; 
Wasserman, 2015). Several cases have been brought against the City of New York, the 
FBI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS; 
e.g., CRC, 2018; 2020). Most relevant to the current study are Hassan v. City of New 
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York (CRC, 2018) and Tanvir v. Tanzin (CRC, 2020). Hassan v. City of New York is a 
lawsuit against the City of New York for their surveillance of Muslim Americans, 
especially in New York and New Jersey. The NYPD’s program for Muslim surveillance 
was brought to light in 2011 by a series of reports by the Associated Press, which 
highlighted the strategies used by police officers, their record keeping, and the largely 
unsuccessful outcomes of the program in detecting terrorism (Apuzzo & Goldman, 
2011a; 2011b; Apuzzo et al., 2011). Police officers worked from a list of “ancestries of 
interest,” most of which were descendent from Muslim countries (e.g., Pakistani, Somali, 
Middle Eastern). Although the NYPD, and then-Mayor Bloomberg, refuted that they 
relied on religious profiling in this program, this claim is brought into doubt by the fact 
that “American Black Muslim” was also included as an ancestry of interest (Apuzzo & 
Goldman, 2011b). 
 Police officers and other law enforcement agencies did not infiltrate Muslim 
communities alone, as they often worked to identify potential informants who could spy 
on their own communities and report back to law enforcement (Apuzzo & Goldman, 
2011b). As part of a “debriefing program,” whenever a person was arrested who might be 
useful for collecting intelligence, police officers were instructed to subject them to extra 
questioning in an attempt to know more about their communities and hopefully, to put 
them to work as informants. Those who refused to comply with instructions to spy on 
their communities were often retaliated against. For example, Tanvir v. Tanzin is a 
lawsuit against the FBI, the DOJ, and the DHS for the placement of several American 
Muslim men with no criminal records on the No-Fly List, a subset of a larger U.S. 
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government terrorist screening database. In this case, the four plaintiffs were reportedly 
approached by the FBI who sought to recruit them as informants within their Muslim 
communities. Following their denial, the men were placed on the No-Fly List which 
resulted in most not being able to see their families overseas for several years (CRC, 
2020). One man was not able to visit his 93-year-old grandmother despite her severe 
illness and another was not able to see his wife and young children for nearly five years. 
The FBI disputes that the men were placed on the No-Fly list as an act of retaliation. The 
fact that each man was reportedly told by the FBI that they could fly again if they agreed 
to work as informants, however, suggests that the men were not truly considered to be 
dangerous, further bringing into question the FBI’s reason for placing them on the No-Fly 
list. 
  Government sanctioned discrimination against Muslims in the United States has 
continued in other ways as well in the years since 9/11. On January 27th, 2017, then-
President Trump signed Executive Order 13769, more commonly known as the Muslim 
Ban (Trump, 2017a). The original Muslim Ban restricted travel from seven 
predominantly Muslim countries to the United States for 90 days, including Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, and suspended the entry of Syrian refugees to 
the United States indefinitely (Trump, 2017a). The Muslim Ban received much criticism 
from the public and the Office of the Inspector General and was determined to violate 
multiple existing court orders by preventing affected travelers from boarding airplanes 
bound for the United States (OIG, 2018). Some evidence also exists that the 
implementation of the Muslim Ban may have violated the Due Process and Equal 
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Protection Clauses of the Constitution which, respectively, protect citizens from 
prosecution without due process of law, and set forth that the law will be applied equally 
to all individuals [Legal Information Institute (LII), n.d.a; n.d.b; OIG, 2018]. In the face 
of these challenges, however, the Trump administration continued to adapt the Muslim 
Ban in minor ways in order to successfully implement restrictions on travel from several 
Muslim-majority countries (ACLU, 2020). The final version of the Muslim Ban, 
Executive Order 13780, was implemented in October of 2017 and placed restrictions on 
travel from eleven countries, eight of which were Muslim-majority countries (i.e., Egypt, 
Iran, Libya, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen; Trump, 2017b). Although this ban 
has since been revoked by President Biden (2021), the effects of the ban are expected to 
be enduring as the already slow process for vetting and approving immigration from 
these countries have become increasingly backlogged during the time the ban was in 
effect (Stone, 2021). Further, an ABC News/Ipsos poll showed that only a slight majority 
of American respondents (55%) supported President Biden’s revocation of the Muslim 
ban (“American Public Supports”, 2021). Thus, not only have those wishing to enter the 
United States have been increasingly denied, but Muslim communities within the United 
States face increased bias and scrutiny by law enforcement.  
Similar to findings regarding the low success rates of other racial profiling 
programs such as stop and frisk (e.g., Gelman et al., 2007), there is a growing body of 
research suggesting that increased policing of Muslims may be ineffective, resulting in 
few terrorism-related charges (Blackwood et al., 2016; Ramirez, 2012). Further, some 
argue that attempting to intercept terrorism through immigration policy is likely to be 
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fruitless given that many of those who commit terrorist attacks are often in the country 
legally. For example, both the 9/11 hijackers and the Boston Marathon bombers were in 
the United States legally at the time of their attacks (Ramirez, 2012). Although terrorist 
attacks are undoubtedly memorable and horrific, there is little evidence that pre-9/11 
methods of deterring terrorism were unsuccessful, considering that less than 0.01% of all 
deaths in the United States were the result of terrorism in the years preceding 2001 
(Ritchie et al., 2019). Further, counterterrorism efforts have even backfired in some cases 
and led Muslims to identify less with their American identity (Blackwood et al., 2016). 
This could allow for the increased radicalization of those who feel they have lost their 
national identity, indicating a need for more empirically formed and less identity-based 
counterterrorism efforts. More specific to the surveillance programs outlined above, AP 
reporting reveals that the surveillance of Muslims and their communities in New York 
City and surrounding areas did not result in a single terrorism-related charge (Apuzzo et 
al., 2011). 
 At this point, it is clear that Muslims and Middle Easterners in the United States 
have been under excessive scrutiny for terrorism-related investigations on the basis of 
their perceived or actual racial and religious identities (CRC, 2018; 2020; Blackwood et 
al., 2016; Henderson et al., 2006). Empirical work demonstrating the prevalence and 
impact of Muslim surveillance by law enforcement, however, is limited, as evidenced by 
the media sources responsible for most of the coverage surrounding these issues and 
limited police reporting. Given that many Americans’ only exposure to Muslims is 
through the media they consume (Pratt, 2011), much of the existing empirical research on 
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support for anti-Muslim policies focuses on the role of media portrayals of Muslims, 
often with an emphasis on military actions and immigration. Mainstream media often 
perpetuates stereotypes of Muslims as outsider terrorists (Kearns et al., 2019b; Shen et 
al., 2018) which can influence attitudes and support for anti-Muslim policy (Andersen et 
al., 2012; Saleem et al., 2017). Specifically, portraying Muslims as terrorists in news 
broadcasts predicted increased support for a number of policies aimed at increasing 
surveillance of Muslims in the United States, as well as increasing military action in 
Muslim-majority countries (Saleem et al., 2017). Similarly, the source and manner in 
which news is communicated can also influence support for discriminatory policies 
against Muslims (Andersen et al., 2012). In particular, news broadcasting showed a 
stronger effect in subsequent policy support than entertainment media (e.g., clips from a 
movie about a Muslim terrorist group). Further, negative, stereotypical coverage led to 
increased support for anti-Muslim policies, while positive, counter-stereotypical coverage 
trended toward decreased support for these policies (Andersen et al., 2012). Recall, 
however, that terrorist attacks received 357% more coverage when perpetrated by a 
Muslim compared to other groups. Thus, not only does the overrepresentation of Islamic 
terrorist attacks in mainstream media perpetuate and reinforce stereotypes about 
Muslims, but it may also influence support for discriminatory policies against Muslims 
(Andersen et al., 2012; Saleem et al., 2017).  
Less research exists on the specific roles of threat perceptions, emotions, and 
individual differences in anti-Muslim policy support. Still, related research provides some 
insights on how these factors influence support for anti-Muslim policies. For example, 
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beliefs that being a “true” New Zealander encompasses specific ancestral heritage and 
cultural characteristics such as speaking English predicted more negative attitudes toward 
Muslims and opposition toward increasing diversity through immigration (Yogeeswaran 
et al., 2019). Although threat perceptions were not directly measured in this study, the 
pattern of findings is consistent with research suggesting that symbolic threat perceptions 
may emerge particularly for those who hold largely ethnic and cultural conceptions of 
their national identity (e.g., Morrison et al., 2010). Additionally, intentions to vote for the 
UK to leave the EU were influenced directly by realistic threat perceptions related to 
Muslim immigrants, as well as indirectly via symbolic threat perceptions (Swami et al., 
2018). This suggests that both concerns about the availability of resources and concerns 
about the national purity of the UK with Islamic influence were able to impact 
participants’ decisions regarding large-scale, national policy change. 
Consistent with research suggesting that individual differences in ideology predict 
threat perceptions in general (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b), the same appears to be true 
for perceived threat by Muslims. Both SDO and RWA predicted threat perceptions of 
Muslims and subsequent support for anti-Muslim policies, specifically (Dunwoody & 
McFarland, 2018). To expand, those with higher levels of SDO and RWA supported a 
law requiring Muslims to register with government organizations, as well as support for 
the use of physical force in order to make Muslims reveal the identity of unregistered 
Muslims. Moreover, each of these relationships was partially mediated by perceived 
threats. Although this study measured perceptions of threat related to realistic, symbolic, 
and terroristic threats, there were no apparent effects of threat type on policy support, and 
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thus, threat perceptions were collapsed into a single score in analyses. One possible 
reason for the lack of effect by threat type, however, may have been a lack of 
consideration of the emotional components of threat perceptions. For example, as 
outlined earlier in this section, emotions appear to play a mediating role in the 
relationship between threat perceptions and anti-Muslim policy support, with anger 
predicting more political intolerance of Muslims, such as not allowing the building of 
mosques, and disgust predicting preference for increased social distance from Muslims, 
such as not wanting Muslims living in one’s neighborhood (Wirtz et al., 2015). Together, 
these findings suggest that many factors may work together to influence attitudes toward 
Muslims, which holds implications for their treatment by both the public and by law 
enforcement in the United States. 
The existing body of research investigating support for anti-Muslim policies 
leaves room for a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms that may be most 
pertinent for reducing stereotypes about Muslims and related fears. One of the challenges 
of creating positive change in policy and policing practices lies in the popularity of 
current policies which are often discriminatory (Andersen et al., 2012; Collingwood et 
al., 2018; Saleem et al., 2017; Swami et al., 2018). Specifically, the fact that much of this 
surveillance is publicly sponsored by state and federal law enforcement agencies 
(Henderson et al., 2006; Keeling & Hughes, 2011; Meeropol, 2015) makes enacting 
change in Muslim policing practices more difficult. Therefore, it is important to 
understand what factors may influence support for discriminatory policies that directly 
impact Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim in the United States. Perceptions of 
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Muslims appear to largely be a result of cultural ignorance and misrepresentation, 
characterized by threat and fear (Pratt, 2011) and several contributing factors of anti-
Muslim policy support have emerged from the existing body of research, including threat 
perceptions (Swami et al., 2018), emotional reactions (Wirtz et al., 2015), and individual 
differences in ideology (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018). Thus, the current study aimed 
to assess the process through which individual differences, threat perceptions, and 
emotions influence anti-Muslim attitudes and subsequent anti-Muslim policy support. 
The Current Study 
 The goals of the current study were threefold. First, consistent with research 
which suggests that threat perceptions underlie prejudice toward Muslims (e.g., 
Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Uenal, 2016) and that certain individual differences in 
ideology may influence perceptions of threat and intergroup bias (Altemeyer, 1981; 
Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Pratto et al., 1994), this study focused on the roles of 
several individual differences in ideology and threat perceptions in levels of 
Islamophobia and subsequent support for anti-Muslim policies. Specifically, this research 
investigated the roles of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism in predicting Islamophobia, as 
well as the mediating roles of realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions in 
these relationships. This aim was also based on my own pilot research that examined the 
relationships between SDO, RWA, and Nationalism on Islamophobia through realistic, 
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions. This preliminary study (N = 191) employed 
structural equation modeling (SEM) and showed that SDO, RWA, and Nationalism 
positively predicted realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions, respectively, 
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and that each type of threat positively predicted Islamophobia. Moreover, the indirect 
effects of SDO and RWA on Islamophobia through realistic and symbolic threat 
perceptions were significant and in the expected directions. The indirect effect of 
Nationalism on Islamophobia through terroristic threat perceptions, however, was 
nonsignificant in this sample. This study was underpowered due to the small sample size 
acquired and the large sample sizes needed to obtain adequate power in SEM. Thus, the 
current study builds on this work by recruiting a larger sample to reach a minimum power 
level of .80, accounting for the interrelations that likely exist between each individual 
difference in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism) and each type of threat perception 
(i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic), and by expanding the model to include the impacts 
of these factors (i.e., individual differences, threat perceptions, Islamophobia) on anti-
Muslim policy support.  
Similar to previous research (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), the second aim of 
this study was to determine the emotional components predicted by each specific threat 
perception. Previous work suggests that several emotions are associated with distinct 
types of threat perceptions (e.g., anger with realistic threats, distrust with symbolic 
threats; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). To date and to my knowledge, no empirical research 
has assessed the emotional components of each type of threat since the addition of 
terroristic threat perceptions into the intergroup threat framework. Thus, this study aimed 
to assess which emotions are associated with and predicted by different types of threat 
perceptions.  
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The third and final aim of the current study was to examine the mediational effect 
of emotional reactions in the relationships between different types of threat perceptions 
and support for discriminatory policies toward Muslims. This aim was based on work 
suggesting that emotional reactions may be useful for predicting different types of 
behaviors (e.g., anger predicting aggression and fear predicting social distancing; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Extant research has not fully investigated the 
roles of individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotional reactions in 
support for anti-Muslim policies, especially those regarding surveillance by law 
enforcement. Altogether, this study aimed to substantially contribute to our understanding 
of individual differences in perceptions of Muslims as threats and their subsequent 
emotional reactions as they relate to Muslim metering and surveillance policy support. 
Hypotheses 
 The current study consists of three main aims which include two main hypotheses 
as well as one data-driven exploratory hypothesis with a theoretically based contingency 
hypothesis. Each of these aims and hypotheses focuses on the roles of individual 
differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotional reactions in bias toward and 
discrimination against Muslims. 
Aim 1 
Aim 1 consists of 4 sub-hypotheses (1a-1d). Overall, it was expected that 
individual differences in ideology would predict threat perceptions which would predict 
Islamophobia and subsequent support for anti-Muslim policies, representing an ideology-
threat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias (see Figure 2). SEM was used to 
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simultaneously test hypotheses 1a-d in a single model. SEM refers to a broad family of 
theory-driven, causal inference techniques based on a given theoretical model and 
parameter specifications (Kline, 2015). Since SEM can take the covariances between 
variables into account when testing the fit of the model and hypotheses (Kline, 2015), 
these techniques can be particularly useful in cases where independent variables are 
expected to correlate, as is the case in the current analysis (e.g., SDO and RWA are 
expected to be related). This model was tested to establish the role of each individual 
difference in threat perceptions, anti-Muslim attitudes (i.e., Islamophobia), and 
subsequent anti-Muslim policy support by comparing the strengths of each mediational 
path. 
Figure 2 
Aim 1 Full Model 
 
Note. Full hypothesized structural equation model for aim 1 with all paths included. 
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Hypothesis 1a. Based on previous research suggesting that SDO predicts 
intergroup bias (e.g., Pratto et al., 2006; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 1994; Sidanius 
et al., 2004) and that SDO may be particularly relevant for realistic threat perceptions 
(e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Thomsen et al., 2008), it was hypothesized that higher 
levels of SDO would predict Islamophobia, with realistic threat perceptions partially 
mediating this relationship. Specifically, it was expected that those with higher levels of 
SDO would be more likely to report perceptions of Muslims as a realistic threat, which 
would increase levels of Islamophobia (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3 
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1a 
 
Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model. 
 Hypothesis 1b. Since research suggests that RWA also predicts intergroup bias 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2012; Rowatt et al., 2005) and that it may be particularly relevant for 
symbolic threat perceptions (e.g., Crowson, 2009), it was hypothesized that RWA would 
predict Islamophobia with symbolic threat perceptions partially mediating this 
relationship. Specifically, it was expected that those with higher levels of RWA would be 
more likely to report perceptions of Muslims as a symbolic threat, which would increase 
levels of Islamophobia (see Figure 4).  




Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1b 
 
Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model. 
Hypothesis 1c. Given research suggesting that Nationalism predicts intergroup 
bias (Ayub & Jehn, 2010) and the theoretical correspondence between Nationalism and 
terroristic threat perceptions (e.g., Andersen et al., 2012; Yogeeswaran et al., 2019), it 
was hypothesized that Nationalism would predict Islamophobia with terroristic threat 
perceptions partially mediating this relationship. Specifically, it was expected that those 
with higher levels of Nationalism would be more likely to report perceptions of Muslims 
as a terroristic threat which would increase levels of Islamophobia (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5 
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1c 
 
Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model. 
Hypothesis 1d. Based on research suggesting that individual differences in 
ideology, threat perceptions, and Islamophobia may all impact levels of support for 
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discriminatory policies (e.g., Elsheikh et al., 2017; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Swami et 
al., 2018), it was expected that Islamophobia would mediate the relationships between 
individual differences, threat perceptions, and support for anti-Muslim policies (e.g., 
increasing surveillance of Muslim communities in the United States). Specifically, it was 
expected that Islamophobia would act as a mediator between threat perceptions and 
policy support, such that those with higher levels of perceived threats would be more 
likely to hold higher levels of Islamophobia, and subsequently, be more likely to support 
anti-Muslim policies (see Figure 6). This is consistent with previous work suggesting that 
threat perceptions predict bias toward other groups and behavioral outcomes such as 
support for policies that would impact relevant groups (Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 
2015). Thus, in total, it was expected that higher levels of each individual difference in 
ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism) would differentially predict higher levels of 
each threat perception (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic), which would predict higher 
levels of Islamophobia and subsequently, increased support for anti-Muslim policies. The 
ideology-threat-attitude-behavior order of predictions in the model is consistent with 
research implicating threat perceptions as mediators between individual differences and 










Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 1d 
 
Note. See figure 2 for full hypothesized model. 
Aim 2 
Similar to previous research investigating the role of threat perceptions in 
emotional reactions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), cluster analysis techniques were used to 
explore the emotional components of threat perceptions of Muslims. This type of analysis 
is an example of unsupervised learning in which the goal is not prediction, but rather to 
discover interesting patterns in a given dataset (James et al., 2013). Cluster analysis refers 
to a wide range of techniques that detect clusters by partitioning them into discrete groups 
in which components within a cluster are similar to one another but dissimilar to 
components within other clusters (James et al., 2013). Aim 2 also consisted of 3 sub-
hypotheses (2a-2c) that were planned to be tested in the event that the cluster analyses 
from the exploratory hypothesis resulted in unclear or theoretically inconsistent clusters 
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of emotions (e.g., fear and distrust clustering together, all emotions cluster into a single 
cluster, results of each cluster analysis vary substantially) and prevented the testing of 
threat perceptions as predictors of emotion clusters. In this case, regression analyses 
would be completed with single-item measures of theoretically relevant emotional 
reactions (i.e., anger, distrust, fear) and compared for fit. 
Exploratory Hypothesis. Although exploratory in nature, previous work 
investigating the emotional components of several types of threat perceptions allowed for 
a general hypothesis for my exploratory analyses. Specifically, based on the work of 
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) and Gervais and colleagues (2011), it was expected that 
symbolic threat perceptions would be characterized by and predict emotions such as 
distrust and disgust. Given that previous work (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) combined 
realistic and terroristic threats in their investigations, less clear hypotheses could be 
made. Still, considering research which suggests that perceptions of challenge and 
competition, which are conceptually similar to power, or realistic threat perceptions, may 
lead to anger, whereas threats to physical safety which are conceptually similar to 
terroristic threat perceptions, may lead to fear (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Lerner et 
al., 2003), it was expected that realistic threats would predict feelings of anger and that 
terroristic threats would predict feelings of fear. 
To determine which emotions cluster with which threat perceptions, several 
clustering approaches were used. First, k-means cluster analysis was used to determine 
how emotions cluster with k (i.e., the number of clusters) set to 3 in order to map onto the 
three threat perception measures being used. This iterative approach is useful for 
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theoretically based questions in which the expected number of non-overlapping clusters 
can be determined (James et al., 2013). Following this approach, hierarchical cluster 
analysis was used to get a more robust picture of the emotion clusters. This approach 
differs from k-means clustering in that k is not set a priori, but rather determined through 
the visualization of a dendrogram that presents all of the possible clusters for any number 
of total clusters from 1-n (James et al., 2013). The solutions in which the within-cluster 
variation was minimized would then be selected from each technique (i.e., k-means and 
hierarchical cluster analysis) and compared to determine the best fit for the emotion 
cluster structure, overall. 
 Although one approach could have been to include threat perceptions in the 
cluster analyses to determine where the threat perceptions cluster with each emotion, the 
fact that these threat perceptions are often correlated (i.e., people who perceive one type 
of threat are likely to perceive the other types of threats) means that including threat 
perceptions in the data-driven clustering approach would likely have convoluted the 
results of the cluster analyses. To avoid this complication, the resulting emotion clusters 
were planned to be used as outcome variables in a series of regression analyses in order 
to determine which threat perceptions (i.e., symbolic, realistic, terroristic) best predict 
each emotion cluster.  
Hypothesis 2a. Based on previous work looking at the emotional components of 
resource-based threat perceptions, it was expected that realistic threat perceptions would 
predict feelings of anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
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Hypothesis 2b. Although disgust has been shown to impact attitudes toward 
Muslims (Wirtz et al., 2015), other research suggests that distrust may be a more relevant 
emotional reaction when groups are perceived as violating religious values such as 
morality (Gervais et al., 2011). Based on these findings and the emphasis of perceived 
threats to western values of the symbolic threat measure used, it was expected that 
symbolic threat perceptions would predict feelings of distrust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Gervais et al., 2011).  
Hypothesis 2c. Based on previous work looking at the emotional components of 
safety-based threat perceptions, it was expected that terroristic threat perceptions would 
predict feelings of fear (Lerner et al., 2003). 
Depending on the conclusions of the exploratory hypothesis, regression analyses 
using either the emotion cluster or the theoretically based discrete emotion predictions 
(hypotheses 2a-2c) were to be compared for fit using R2 and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) estimates, where Y = each emotion cluster or outcome (i.e., realistic 
cluster or anger, symbolic cluster or distrust, and terroristic cluster or fear), r = realistic 
threat perceptions, s = symbolic threat perceptions, and t = terroristic threat perceptions: 
Yrc/a = b0 + X1r + e1 
Ysc/d = b0 + X1s + e2 
Ytc/f = b0 + X1t + e3 
Aim 3 
Aim 3 consists of 3 sub-hypotheses (3a-3c). Overall, it was expected that threat 
perceptions would predict threat-based emotional reactions which would predict support 
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for anti-Muslim policies, representing a threat-emotion-behavior model of anti-Muslim 
bias (see Figure 7). Similar to aim 1, SEM was used to simultaneously test hypotheses 
3a-3c. This technique is useful for estimating predictive relationships between multiple 
variables within a single model as it accounts for covariances between exogenous (i.e., 
predictive) variables (Kline, 2015). This is particularly useful given the expected 
correlations between each type of perceived threat. Similar to the first structural equation 
model, the role of each emotion cluster (i.e., realistic cluster, symbolic cluster, terroristic 
cluster) or discrete emotion (i.e., anger, distrust, fear) in mediating the relationships 
between threat perceptions and anti-Muslim policy support was examined by comparing 
the strengths of each mediational path. This model was tested separately from the first 
structural equation model which investigates more general attitudes toward Muslims (i.e., 
Islamophobia) in order to develop a better understanding of the mediating roles of 
specific emotions in the relationship between threat perceptions and anti-Muslim policy. 
This was tested separately from the first structural equation model for both theoretical 
and practical reasons. First, although there is evidence to suggest that threat perceptions 
predict emotional reactions, to my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence indicating 
whether emotions would predict or be predicted by Islamophobia, making the structure of 
a combined model unclear. Additionally, since the definition of Islamophobia is largely 
based on fear toward Muslims and the religion of Islam, including both Islamophobia and 
emotions toward Muslims, such as fear, would likely have introduced redundancy into 
the model. More practically, increasing the number of variables and paths to be estimated 
in the model would have increased model complexity which can have adverse effects on 
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power. For these reasons, two structural equation models were tested separately to 
determine 1) the role of individual differences in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes and 
policy support through perceived threat, and 2) the role of perceived threat on anti-
Muslim policy support through distinct emotional reactions. 
Figure 7 
Aim 3 Full Model 
 
Note. Full hypothesized structural equation model for aim 3 with all paths included. 
 Hypothesis 3a. Research suggests that threat perceptions predict different 
emotional reactions, which may lead to different evaluative and behavioral outcomes, 
such as support for discriminatory policies toward a number of groups (e.g., Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that realistic threat perceptions would predict support for anti-Muslim 
policies through its associated emotional components, which was determined in the 
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exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c outlined above. Specifically, higher levels 
of realistic threat perceptions were expected to predict increased support for an anti-
Muslim policy regarding Muslim surveillance with this relationship partially mediated by 
increased levels of the realistic emotion cluster or anger (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8 
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 3a 
 
Note. See figure 7 for full hypothesized model. 
 Hypothesis 3b. Similar to hypothesis 3a, it was expected that higher levels of 
symbolic threat perceptions would predict increased support for an anti-Muslim policy 
regarding Muslim surveillance and that this relationship would be partially mediated by 
increased levels of the symbolic emotion cluster or distrust (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9 
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 3b 
 
Note. See figure 7 for full hypothesized model. 
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 Hypothesis 3c. It was hypothesized that higher levels of terroristic threat 
perceptions would predict increased support for an anti-Muslim policy regarding Muslim 
surveillance and that this relationship would be partially mediated by increased levels of 
the terroristic emotion cluster or fear (see Figure 10). 
Figure 10 
Theoretical Model for Hypothesis 3c 
 
Note. See figure 7 for full hypothesized model. 
  





The current study primarily used structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the 
various hypotheses. Given the flexible nature of structural equation modeling and the 
model-dependent nature of a priori power analyses, there are not currently clear 
guidelines on how to conduct a priori power analyses using well-established tools, such 
as G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). Guidelines about the minimum number of participants 
necessary for adequate power (Wolf et al., 2013), as well as previous research testing 
similar types of mediational structural equation models (Uenal, 2016) suggest that a 
sample size of at least 200 is sufficient to detect small to medium effects (.10 - .50) with a 
power level of .80. In addition to these guidelines, an online SEM power calculator 
(Zhang & Yuan, 2018) based on the suggestions of Satorra and Saris (1985) was used to 
determine the sample size necessary to detect a small effect (.10) with a power level of 
.80. This calculator is based on the Chi-square test. The results of these power analyses 
indicated that a minimum sample size of 138 for the first structural equation model (i.e., 
hypotheses 1a-1d) and a minimum sample size of 110 for the second structural equation 
model would be adequate to detect small to medium effects at a power level of .80. 
Additionally, data simulation based on pilot data was used to better determine the ability 
to detect effects within the proposed models with various sample sizes. Based on these 
analyses, 500 participants were recruited to ensure a conservative sample size for all 
measures of interest after data reduction due to non-responding on certain items or early 
exit from the survey. 




Three-hundred and sixty-one participants were collected through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and 336 participants were collected through Portland State 
University (PSU) for a total of 697 participants. All recruitment was completely online 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were recruited from these two populations 
in order to ensure a politically diverse enough sample. Although student samples tend to 
be more liberal than the general population, samples collected from MTurk tend to be 
more politically diverse and show similar reliability to more traditional sampling methods 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Feitosa et al., 2015; Johnson & Borden, 2012). Given that 
several hypotheses were related to individual differences that are often associated with 
political orientation, the distributions of political ideology across samples were examined 
for normality to assess whether more targeted participant recruitment was required prior 
to hypothesis testing. As expected, when comparing the PSU and MTurk samples, there 
was a significant difference in political orientation with PSU participants being more 
liberal on average (M = 5.58, SD = 1.30) compared to MTurk participants (M = 4.54, SD 
= 1.92), t(608) = -7.73, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.31, -0.78]. Overall, the distribution of the 
combined sample was relatively normally distributed, however, with an average of 5.02 
(SD = 1.74) and a skewness value of -0.75 which is well below the recommended 
absolute value of 2 (Gravetter et al., 2020). Although a greater proportion of the full 
sample reported being slightly to very liberal (64.2% compared to 16.9% moderate and 
18.8% slightly to very conservative), more conservative participants were not recruited 
based on the overall normal distribution.  
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PSU students were recruited through online course announcements by their 
instructors in classes across several academic departments between September and 
December of 2020. MTurk participants were recruited through the Cloud Research 
Toolkit platform on September 19th, October 4th, and October 19th of 2020. Participant 
recruitment was conducted over the course of several weeks and months in part to 
address the tumultuous and variable social and political climate in the United States 
surrounding the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the spike in Black Lives Matter protests 
across the country, and the 2020 presidential election. Given that no major events specific 
to Muslims in the United States or updates with the Muslim ban occurred during data 
collection, it was hoped that spreading out data collection aided in drowning out the 
potential for political events to impact responses to the current study. As with any study, 
however, findings should be considered within the historical and social context in which 
they are based. 
Precautions were taken to ensure that robotic accounts were not able to access the 
survey through MTurk, including the use of a Completely Automated Public Turing test 
to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA). Geographic locations were restricted 
to the United States given that the hypotheses concerned attitudes of those living in the 
United States, specifically. Several data cleaning measures were taken prior to analyses. 
Thirty-seven participants were removed for failing to take the survey or complete the 
measures of interest beyond the demographics. Out of the remaining participants, 9 were 
removed for identifying as Muslims, and 1 participant was removed for being under the 
age of 18. No participants reported residing outside of the United States. An additional 16 
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participants were removed due to duplicate IP addresses. Finally, 31 participants were 
removed for failing an attention check item. The final sample consisted of 603 
participants (346 women, 234 men, 13 nonbinary, 4 other) with an average age of about 
35 years (M = 34.7, SD = 14.1). Overall, the sample was predominantly White (394 
White, 41 Black, 48 Latin-o/a/x, 60 Asian, 45 multiracial, and 14 other), and slightly 
liberal, although political orientation was still relatively normally distributed (M = 5.01, 
SD = 1.77). 
Procedure 
After completing the informed consent, participants completed a series of 
questionnaires measuring social attitudes including SDO (Ho et al., 2015), RWA 
(Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007), and Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). 
Participants also completed measures indicating their level of each type of perceived 
threat of Muslims (Uenal, 2016), emotional reactions toward Muslims (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005), level of Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2013), and support for several policies 
that restrict the rights of Muslims in the United States. Finally, participants read about the 
proposal of a senate bill that would allow police officers in the United States to stop and 










Social Attitudes  
Participants began by completing several scales intended to assess a number of 
social attitudes, including SDO (Ho et al., 2015), RWA (Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 
2007), and Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).  
 Social Dominance Orientation. SDO was measured using a shortened Social 
Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO7; Ho et al., 2015) which consists of eight items 
measuring two subdimensions: dominance (SDO-D) and egalitarianism (SDO-E). 
Generally, SDO indicates one’s support of existing social hierarchies that place certain 
groups of people above or below others (Pratto et al., 2006; Pratto et al., 1994), with the 
dominance subscale representing beliefs in active oppression of subordinate groups by 
dominant groups, and the egalitarianism subscale representing beliefs in the maintenance 
of social inequality (Ho et al., 2015). All items were measured on a 7-point Likert-style 
scale with higher values indicating more endorsement of each item (1-Strongly Disagree, 
7-Strongly Agree). Example items include, “An ideal society requires some groups to be 
on top and others to be on the bottom” (dominance), and “We should work to give all 
groups an equal chance to succeed” (egalitarianism, reverse-coded). Based on the goals 
of the current study to understand the role of both SDO-D and SDO-E in predicting 
perceptions of Muslims and subsequent policy support, an average of the full SDO7 scale 
was used for analyses, α = .88. 
 Right-wing Authoritarianism. RWA was measured using a shortened version of 
the RWA scale which consists of two subdimensions: aggression and submission, and 
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conservatism (Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007). Fourteen items were measured on a 7-
point Likert-style scale with higher values indicating more endorsement of each item (1-
Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). Example items include “Obedience and respect for 
authority are the most important values children should learn,” (aggression and 
submission), and “Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual 
preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else” (conservatism, reverse-
coded). This scale can be used by aggregating the full scale or each subdimensions 
depending on the specific hypotheses being tested (e.g., if they are related to one aspect 
of RWA, specifically, or levels of RWA, generally). Based on the goals of the current 
study to understand the role of both RWA aggression and submission and RWA 
conservatism, an average of the full RWA scale was used for analyses, α = .94. 
 Nationalism. Nationalism was measured using the Nationalism subscale of the 
Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). This subscale 
represents the view that the United States is superior and should be dominant over other 
countries. All eight items were measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale with one item 
reverse-coded so that higher values indicated more endorsement of each item (1-Strongly 
Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). Example items include, “Generally, the more influence 
America has on other nations, the better off they are,” and “Other countries should try to 
make their governments as much like ours as possible.” Based on the hypotheses related 
to Nationalism and its ethnocentric components, specifically, only the Nationalism 
subscale of the broader Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire was used, α = .91.  
 




Participants completed another series of questions intended to measure intergroup 
bias, including perceived threats posed by Muslims (Uenal, 2016), emotional responses 
toward Muslims (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), level of Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2013), and 
support of discriminatory policies against Muslims.  
Threat Perceptions. Realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions toward 
Muslims were assessed using a measure adapted from Uenal (2016). Realistic threat 
perceptions represent threats to one’s resources or social status, with an example item 
being, “Because of the presence of Muslims in the United States, Americans have more 
difficulties finding a job,” α = .95. Symbolic threat perceptions represent threats to one’s 
moral or worldview, with an example item being, “I am worried that the American norms 
and values are threatened by the presence of Muslims,” α = .97. Finally, terroristic threat 
perceptions represent threats to one’s physical safety or security, with an example item 
being, “It is only a matter of time before the United States will become a target for 
Islamist terrorists,” α = .90. All eleven items were measured on a 7-point Likert-style 
scale with higher values indicating more perceived threat (1-Strongly Disagree, 7-
Strongly Agree). Threat perceptions were aggregated separately to create three scores that 
represent levels of each type of perceived threat. 
 Emotional Reactions. Emotional reactions toward Muslims were measured using 
items from Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) which assess levels of several different emotions 
in response to different groups of people. These emotional reactions have been shown to 
predict intergroup bias in previous research (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais et 
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al., 2011). An example item for this scale would be “When I think about Muslims, I feel 
[fear, anger, distrust, disgust, anxiety, envy, pity, guilt].” All items were measured on a 5-
point Likert-style scale with higher values indicating higher levels of that emotion (1-Not 
at all, 5-Extremely). Based on a sociofunctional approach to prejudice that suggests 
certain emotions are representative of different kinds of perceived threats (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011), separate scores for each emotional 
reaction were used in analyses. Positive emotions were not measured as they were not 
expected to be representative of the negative types of perceived threats being investigated 
in the current study and have typically not been used in previous analyses investigating 
the emotional components of threat perceptions (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
 Islamophobia. Levels of Islamophobia were measured with the Islamophobia 
scale which measures feelings of fear toward Muslims and Islam (Lee et al., 2013). This 
scale consists of items relating to anti-Muslim attitudes (e.g., “If I could, I would avoid 
contact with Muslims.”) and anti-Islam attitudes (e.g., “Islam is a dangerous religion”). 
All items were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale with higher values indicating 
higher levels of Islamophobia (1-Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). Items were 
aggregated to create an average measure of Islamophobia including both anti-Muslim and 
anti-Islam attitudes, α = .98.  
 Policy Support. Endorsement of discriminatory policies was assessed by having 
participants report their level of agreement with three statements about different policy 
initiatives, as well as responding to a “recently proposed bill” that would increase 
surveillance of Muslim communities by the police. The anti-Muslim policy measure used 
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for aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) consisted of three policy initiative items that were measured 
on a 7-point Likert-style scale with higher values indicating more agreement with each 
statement (1-Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly Agree). The three items included, “I would 
support a policy to require government surveillance of all U.S. mosques”, “I would 
support a policy banning the entry of all Muslims into the United States”, and “I would 
support state universities limiting enrollment by members of racial and religious groups 
in proportion to their percentage of the state’s population.” These items were averaged to 
provide a composite score of general support for anti-Muslim policies, α = .94. Although 
the item regarding university enrollment comes from previous work (Nobles & Nobles, 
1954, as cited in Andersen et al., 2012), the lack of empirical research on policies relating 
to Muslims specifically led to the self-development of the remaining two items based on 
proposed and actual policies in the United States (Al Jazeera, 2020; CRC, 2018; 2020). 
For the anti-Muslim policy outcome used for aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c), participants read 
a short paragraph describing a fictitious bill that was recently proposed to increase police 
surveillance of mosques and Muslim community centers (see Appendix). This bill was 
based on activities of the covert NYPD Demographics Unit which were revealed in 2011 
(Apuzzo & Goldman, 2011a; 2011b; Apuzzo et al., 2011). This paragraph outlined a 
recent bill (S.B. 5483) that was scheduled for a vote by the Senate and would enable local 
police to follow and question anyone seen leaving a mosque or Muslim community 
center with “reasonable suspicion”. This was followed by a series of questions regarding 
the participant’s thoughts and feelings about the passing of that bill which were 
aggregated into an average score indicating support for the proposed bill (e.g., “The 
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passing of this bill will make the United States safer”; 1-Strongly Disagree, 7-Strongly 
Agree; α = .91). 
Demographics  
Participants completed demographic information including their racial and ethnic 
identity, gender identity, religious identity, age, and political ideology (see Appendix).  
  





 Univariate normality was assessed using boxplots which showed positively 
skewed distributions with some potential outliers on almost all of the variables of interest. 
Although positively skewed, most of the skewness and kurtosis values were below 2 
(Gravetter & Wallnau, 2014) with the exception of the general anti-Muslim policy 
measure (kurtosis = 2.14). Given the nature of the distribution and the fact that these 
variables were measured on a restricted range of 1-7, the identified potential outliers were 
retained. Potential multivariate outliers were detected using Mahalanobis Distance using 
the variables of interest in each model. Most participants were identified as potential 
multivariate outliers for both aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) and aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c). 
Given the large number of variables included in each model and the skew observed in the 
univariate distributions, all participants from the reduced sample described in the 
methods section were retained for all analyses. 
The fact that almost all participants were identified as multivariate outliers 
suggests that the assumption of multivariate normality was violated. To follow up on this, 
Mardia’s test of multivariate normality was conducted (Korkmaz et al., 2014). The results 
of this test confirmed the suspicion that multivariate normality could not be assumed in 
the analyses, warranting consideration when interpreting results1. The assumptions of 
 
1 Both structural equation models were also run with maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard 
errors and a scaled test statistic due to the violation of multivariate normality. These more conservative 
estimates did not change any of the interpretations of findings in either direction of relationships or changes 
to significance levels. Thus, the reported analyses are based on the originally planned estimation method 
(i.e., full information maximum likelihood with bootstrapped standard errors). 
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homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were also assessed using QQ plots and variance 
inflation factors (VIF). All QQ plots showed acceptable levels of homoscedasticity 
except for the emotional reactions which appeared somewhat abnormal, suggesting some 
heteroscedasticity. VIF values were computed for both structural equation models. All 
VIF values for the first SEM were well below 10, suggesting that there were no 
multicollinearity issues with the variables included in SEM 1 (i.e., SDO, RWA, 
Nationalism, realistic threats, symbolic threats, terroristic threats, Islamophobia, and 
support for anti-Muslim policies). Most VIF values for the second SEM were below 10, 
with about 63 values indicating potential multicollinearity issues between the variables in 
SEM 2 (i.e., realistic threats, symbolic threats, terroristic threats, anger, distrust, and fear, 
and support for surveillance-specific anti-Muslim policy). Given the addition of the 
emotional reaction variables in SEM 2, it may be that the emotional reactions measured 
overlap conceptually to an extent, and thus, the values were retained for analyses with 
this consideration in mind. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables of interest in the 
first SEM, the cluster analysis, and the second SEM can be found in Tables 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. As expected, SDO, RWA, Nationalism, and all perceptions of threat (i.e., 
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic) were moderately, positively correlated with one 
another with correlation coefficients ranging between .46 and .85 (see Table 1). 
Differences in the magnitude of correlations between SDO, RWA, and Nationalism and 
each type of threat perception were relatively small, suggesting that all of these variables 
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are moderately correlated with one another. Each of these variables was also moderately, 
positively related to Islamophobia and both policy measures (see Tables 1 and 3). Finally, 
emotional reactions toward Muslims were all positively correlated. Fear, anger, distrust, 
disgust, and anxiety were all strongly correlated with correlation coefficients ranging 
between .70 and .85. Pity, envy, and guilt showed moderate correlations with one another 
(correlation coefficients between .42 and .58) and small to moderate correlations with 
fear, anger, distrust, disgust, and anxiety (correlation coefficients between .10 and .35; 
see Table 2). 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 M SD
1. SDO - 2.16 1.13
2. RWA .61*** - 2.78 1.32
3. Nationalism .55*** .77*** - 2.84 1.37
4. Realistic .63*** .67*** .65*** - 1.96 1.39
5. Symbolic .57*** .67*** .62*** .85*** - 2.15 1.67
6. Terroristic .45*** .51*** .54*** .69*** .77*** - 2.91 1.77
7. Islamophobia .58*** .63*** .61*** .85*** .89*** .74*** - 2.14 1.56
8. Policy Support .58*** .67*** .65*** .81*** .80*** .64*** .88*** - 1.97 1.55
* p  < .05, ** p  < .01, *** p  < .001
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Aim 1 Structural Equation Model
Table 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 M SD
1. Fear - 1.8 1.14
2. Anger .82*** - 1.64 1.08
3. Distrust .83*** .79*** - 1.91 1.22
4. Disgust .74*** .85*** .76*** - 1.58 1.05
5. Anxiety .85*** .75*** .79*** .70*** - 1.71 1.07
6. Pity .27*** .29*** .26*** .28*** .32*** - 1.64 1.05
7. Guilt .19*** .19*** .10* .15** .23*** .47*** - 1.45 0.91
8. Envy .31*** .32*** .25*** .33*** .35*** .42*** .58*** - 1.18 0.58
* p  < .05, ** p  < .01, *** p  < .001
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Aim 2 Cluster Analyses
Table 2





Aim 1: Hypotheses 1a-1d 
Aim 1 of the current study investigated the roles of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism 
in predicting realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions, Islamophobia, and 
anti-Muslim policy support. Structural equation modeling was used to simultaneously test 
hypotheses 1a-d in a single model using maximum likelihood estimation in the lavaan 
package in R (Rosseel, 2012). All indirect effects were tested using 500 bootstrapped 
standard errors based on simulations used to determine how many bootstrapped standard 
errors were needed to stabilize the standard errors for each path. Specifically, this model 
tested the hypotheses that a) SDO predicts Islamophobia through perceived realistic 
threats about Muslims, b) RWA predicts Islamophobia through perceived symbolic 
threats about Muslims, c) Nationalism predicts Islamophobia through perceived 
terroristic threats about Muslims, and d) Islamophobia mediates the relationships between 
threat perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) and support for policies that 
discriminate against Muslims (e.g., support for a Muslim ban) while controlling for 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD
1. Realistic - 1.96 1.39
2. Symbolic .85*** - 2.15 1.67
3. Terroristic .69*** .77*** - 2.91 1.77
4. Anger .60*** .63*** .52*** - 1.64 1.08
5. Distrust .58*** .65*** .58*** .79*** - 1.91 1.22
6. Fear .58*** .62*** .57*** .82*** .83*** - 1.8 1.14
7. Surveillance 
Policy Support .71*** .68*** .53*** .42*** .42*** .42*** - 2.02 1.28
* p  < .05, ** p  < .01, *** p  < .001
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Aim 3 Structural Equation Model
Table 3
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participant political orientation and gender2. Given the validated nature of the scales used 
in this study, this model utilized observed variables rather than taking a latent approach to 
modeling which incorporates the measurement model. Although the chi-square value was 
significant, 𝜒2 (9) = 61.59, p < .01, suggesting poor fit to the data, alternative fit indices 
were also examined to determine whether the fit was adequate. Overall, the structural 
equation model showed good fit to the data (CFI = .98, SRMR = .02) based on standards 
suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999) for a good fitting model of at least .95 for the CFI fit 
index and at most .08 for the SMSR fit index. A post hoc power analysis using the 
semPower package in R (Moshagen & Erdfelder, 2016)3 indicated that a power level of 
.99 was achieved for this model. 
In terms of hypothesis testing, several specific hypotheses for aim 1 were 
confirmed while others were not (see Figure 11). In partial support of hypothesis 1a, 
results indicated that SDO directly predicted realistic threat perceptions, b = .40, SE = 
.06, 𝛽 = .33, p < .001 but not Islamophobia, b = .10, SE = .05, 𝛽 = .07, ns, when 
accounting for the multiple mediators included in the model (i.e., realistic, symbolic, and 
 
2 Both the SEM for aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) and aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c) were also tested with 
participant sub-sample (i.e., PSU or MTurk) included as a covariate to ensure the sampling method did not 
impact the results. The inclusion of this covariate did not change the direction of effects or interpretation of 
findings. The only change in path significance was for the indirect path between RWA and Islamophobia 
through perceived terroristic threat in the aim 1 SEM which still trended in the same direction but became 
marginally significant in the model including this additional covariate. 
3 Due to complications in utilizing the same SEM power calculator used for a priori power analyses for post 
hoc power analyses, a newer and more recently updated tool was identified. This package has undergone 
more vetting by the Comprehensive R Archive Network and may be more reliable than the tool used for a 
priori analyses. To compare the tools, mock “a priori” power analyses for both SEMs were conducted 
based on the parameters used in the original a priori power analyses. Results suggested that while an 
adequate sample was collected to detect an effect for SEM 1, the sample size may be too small for SEM 2, 
resulting in an underpowered model. It should be noted that this power is specific to model fit coefficients, 
however, and not path coefficients. 
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terroristic threat perceptions). Further, the indirect effect of SDO on Islamophobia 
through realistic threat perceptions was significant, b = .11, SE = .03, 𝛽 = .08, p < .01, 
95% CI [0.05, 0.17], suggesting that as levels of SDO increased, perceived realistic threat 
of Muslims increased, which in turn, predicted higher levels of Islamophobia. The 
indirect effect between SDO and Islamophobia through realistic threat perceptions was 
slightly smaller than the indirect effects between SDO and Islamophobia through 
symbolic, b = .16, SE = .04, 𝛽 = .12, p < .001, 95% CI [0.07, 0.24], and larger than the 
indirect effects between SDO and Islamophobia through terroristic threat perceptions, b = 
.02, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .02, p < .05, 95% CI [0.00, 0.04]. 
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In support of hypothesis 1b, RWA predicted symbolic threat perceptions, b = .46, 
SE = .09, 𝛽 = .36, p < .001, but not Islamophobia, b = -.05, SE = .05, 𝛽 = -.04, ns. The 
indirect effect of RWA on Islamophobia through symbolic threat perceptions, however, 
was significant, b = .23, SE = .05, 𝛽 = .20, p < .001, 95% CI [0.13, 0.33], suggesting that 
as levels of RWA increased, perceived symbolic threat of Muslims increased, which in 
turn, predicted higher levels of Islamophobia. The indirect effect between RWA and 
Islamophobia through symbolic threat perceptions was stronger than the indirect effects 
between RWA and Islamophobia through realistic, b = .07, SE = .02, 𝛽 = .06, p < .01, 
95% CI [0.02, 0.12], or terroristic threat perceptions, b = .02, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .02, p < .05, 
95% CI [0.00, 0.05]. 
In partial support of hypothesis 1c, Nationalism predicted terroristic threat 
perceptions, b = .41, SE = .09, 𝛽 = .32, p < .001, but not Islamophobia, b = .04, SE = .04, 
𝛽 = .03, ns. The indirect effect of Nationalism on Islamophobia through terroristic threat 
perceptions, however, was significant, b = .04, SE = .02, 𝛽 = .04, p < .05, 95% CI [0.01, 
0.07], suggesting that as levels of Nationalism increased, perceived terroristic threat of 
Muslims increased, which in turn, predicted higher levels of Islamophobia. The indirect 
effect between Nationalism and Islamophobia through terroristic threat perceptions was 
smaller than the indirect effects between Nationalism and Islamophobia through realistic, 
b = .08, SE = .03, 𝛽 = .07, p < .01, 95% CI [0.02, 0.15], and symbolic threat perceptions, 
b = .15, SE = .04, 𝛽 = .13, p < .001, 95% CI [0.07, 0.21]. 
In support of hypothesis 1d, Islamophobia was predicted by realistic, b = .28, SE 
= .07, 𝛽 = .25, p < .001, symbolic, b = .50, SE = .06, 𝛽 = .54, p < .001, and terroristic 
MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY 
 
78 
threat perceptions, b = .10, SE = .03, 𝛽 = .11, p < .01, and anti-Muslim policy support 
was predicted by Islamophobia, b = .68, SE = .08, 𝛽 = .68, p < .001. Further, 
Islamophobia significantly mediated the relationships between realistic, b = .19, SE = .05, 
𝛽 = .17, p < .001, 95% CI [0.10, 0.28], symbolic, b = .34, SE = .05, 𝛽 = .37, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.24, 0.45], and terroristic threat perceptions, b = .07, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.08, p < .01, 
95% CI [0.02, 0.12], and anti-Muslim policy support, suggesting that as each type of 
perceived threat increased, feelings of Islamophobia increased, which then lead to 
increased support for anti-Muslim policies.  
Together, these findings largely supported hypothesis 1 that SDO, RWA, and 
Nationalism each predict Islamophobia through several types of perceived threat (i.e., 
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic) which subsequently predicts support for anti-Muslim 
policies (e.g., Muslim ban). One deviation from the expected findings was that the 
indirect effects of each type of perceived threat did not vary substantially in size from 
each predictor (e.g., SDO, RWA) to Islamophobia. For example, the indirect effect of 
realistic threat perceptions on the relationship between SDO and Islamophobia was 
slightly weaker than that of symbolic threat perceptions but slightly stronger than that of 
terroristic threat perceptions. This indirect effect may be driven by the stronger effect of 
symbolic threats on Islamophobia given that each ideological difference variable directly 
predicted the expected type of threat perception better than the other ideological 
difference variables (i.e., SDO best predicted realistic threats, RWA best predicted 
symbolic threats, Nationalism best predicted terroristic threats). These differences were 
small, however, and would likely not hold much practical significance even if the 
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differences were statistically significantly different. Rather, the pattern of findings that 
each of these types of threat perceptions acted as mediators between each of the 
individual difference characteristic (i.e., SDO, RWA, and Nationalism) while accounting 
for the effects of one another suggests that these ideological constructs are likely to 
independently facilitate perceived threats to one’s resources, values, and safety (see Table 
4 for all direct and indirect effects). Further, the finding that Islamophobia simultaneously 
mediated the relationships between realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions 
and anti-Muslim policy support suggested that perceived threats influenced both general 
intergroup attitudes (i.e., Islamophobia) and more specific behavioral intentions that 
would negatively impact specific groups (i.e., anti-Muslim policy support). Overall, the 
full model accounted for about 80% of the variance in anti-Muslim policy support (r2 = 
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Aim 2: Exploratory Hypothesis and Hypotheses 2a-2c 
The second aim of this study attempted to determine the emotional components of 
distinct types of threat perceptions. Aim 2 consisted of both a data-driven exploratory 
hypothesis and a theory-based hypothesis in the event that the results of the exploratory 
hypothesis were unclear. Several clustering approaches were used in order to determine 
which emotions clustered with which threat perceptions. First, k-means cluster analysis 
was used to determine how emotions cluster with the number of clusters set to 3 to map 
onto the 3 threat perception measures used. Given that this is an iterative process that is 
initially randomly configured, the k-means clustering approach was run approximately 25 
times (James et al., 2013). Hierarchical cluster analysis was then used to get a more 
robust picture of the emotion clusters using an average link dissimilarity based on 
Euclidean distance (James et al., 2013). Visualization of the dendrogram presenting all of 
the possible clusters suggested that a 2-cluster solution was more ideal than the 3-cluster 
solution that was expected to emerge. Overall, the findings of the cluster analyses were 
inconclusive with a large majority of participants clustering into the first cluster. Rather 
than revealing clusters containing different discrete emotions, as was expected, the 
resulting clusters appeared to represent the magnitude of endorsement of all emotional 
reactions (i.e., low, medium, and high emotion endorsers), leaving it unclear how to 
aggregate different emotions into broader categories as was intended. This helps explain 
why most participants fell within the first cluster as the emotion variables were skewed 
with most people reporting low endorsement of all emotional reactions toward Muslims. 
Given that the interest in emotions involves the impact of categorically discrete types of 
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emotion (e.g., anger as opposed to distrust), rather than the overall magnitude of emotion 
endorsement, several theoretically relevant emotional reaction items were used as 
observed variables in the regression models and SEM 2 (i.e., anger, distrust, and fear).  
Based on the inconclusive results of the cluster analyses, the contingency plan 
described previously was employed and hypotheses 2a-2c were tested to determine if 
different types of threat perceptions better predicted emotions that should theoretically be 
more or less related to different threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais et al., 2011; 
Lerner et al., 2003). A series of regression analyses were run and compared for fit with 
the expectation that 1) realistic threat perceptions would best predict feelings of anger 
compared to symbolic and terroristic threat perceptions, 2) symbolic threat perceptions 
would best predict feelings of distrust compared to realistic and terroristic threat 
perceptions, and 3) terroristic threat perceptions would best predict fear compared to 
realistic and symbolic threat perceptions. Three non-nested models for each emotion (i.e., 
anger, distrust, and fear) were compared for fit using the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) to determine which type of perceived threat best predicted each emotion. Models 
with lower BIC values are considered better fitting models. In general, differences that 
are less than 2 are not considered practically meaningful, differences between 2 and 6 
provide some evidence of a superior model, differences between 6 and 10 provide strong 
evidence of a superior model, and differences larger than 10 provide very strong evidence 
of a better fitting model (Fabozzi et al., 2014). 
In partial support of hypothesis 2a, anger was predicted by realistic, b = .42, SE = 
.03, 𝛽 =.59, p < .001, 95% CI [0.37, 0.48], BIC = 1079.94, symbolic, b = .37, SE = .02, 𝛽 
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=.63, p < .001, 95% CI [0.33, 0.42], BIC = 1046.81, and terroristic threat perceptions, b = 
.31, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.52, p < .001, 95% CI [0.26, 0.36], BIC = 1120.15 (see Table 5). In 
contradiction to predictions, standardized coefficients suggested that anger was more 
strongly predicted by realistic than terroristic threat perceptions but was more strongly 
predicted by symbolic than realistic threat perceptions. Comparison of BIC values 
suggested that symbolic threats predicting anger resulted in the best fitting model, 
followed by realistic and terroristic threat perceptions, respectively. All BIC difference 
values between the three models were greater than 10, providing strong evidence that 
symbolic threat perceptions were a better predictor of anger toward Muslims than 
realistic or terroristic threat perceptions.  
 
In support of hypothesis 2b, distrust was also predicted by realistic, b = .47, SE = 
.03, 𝛽 =.57, p < .001, 95% CI [0.40, 0.53], BIC = 1247.88, symbolic, b = .44, SE = .02, 𝛽 
=.65, p < .001, 95% CI [0.39, 0.49], BIC = 1175.44, and terroristic threat perceptions, b = 
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.39, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.58, p < .001, 95% CI [0.34, 0.44], BIC = 1237.69 (see Table 6). As 
predicted, standardized coefficients suggested that distrust was more strongly predicted 
by symbolic than realistic or terroristic threat perceptions. Further, the BIC value 
indicated that this was the best fitting regression model. Comparison of BIC values 
suggested that symbolic threats predicting distrust resulted in the best fitting model, 
followed by terroristic and realistic threat perceptions, respectively. All BIC difference 
values between the three models were greater than 10, providing strong evidence that 
symbolic threat perceptions were a better predictor of distrust toward Muslims than 
realistic or terroristic threat perceptions. 
 
In partial support of hypothesis 2c, fear was predicted by realistic, b = .44, SE = 
.03, 𝛽 =.58, p < .001, 95% CI [0.38, 0.50], BIC = 1173.79, symbolic, b = .39, SE = .02, 𝛽 
=.61, p < .001, 95% CI [0.34, 0.44], BIC = 1138.29, and terroristic threat perceptions, b = 
.36, SE = .03, 𝛽 =.57, p < .001, 95% CI [0.31, 0.41], BIC = 1168.65 (see Table 7). 
Contrary to predictions, standardized coefficients suggested that fear was more strongly 
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predicted by symbolic threat perceptions than realistic or terroristic threat perceptions. 
Comparison of BIC values suggested that symbolic threats predicting fear resulted in the 
best fitting model, followed by terroristic and realistic threat perceptions, respectively. 
The BIC difference values between symbolic threat and both realistic and terroristic 
threat perceptions were larger than 10, providing strong evidence that symbolic threat 
perceptions were a better predictor of fear toward Muslims than realistic or terroristic 
threat perceptions. The BIC difference value between realistic and terroristic threat 
perceptions, however, was only 5.14, providing some evidence that terroristic threat 
perceptions were a better predictor of fear than realistic threat perceptions.  
Based on the small differences in standardized effect sizes between each type of 
threat perception in predicting each emotion, these findings suggest that there is likely 
overlap in the relationships between each type of perceived threat and emotional 
responses to groups perceived as threatening. Additionally, given that symbolic threat 
perceptions came out as a better predictor of each emotion than realistic or terroristic 
threat perceptions, there is some evidence that symbolic threat perceptions may be more 
likely to elicit several kinds of emotional responses compared to realistic or terroristic 
threat perceptions. 




Aim 3: Hypotheses 3a-3c 
As with aim 1, structural equation modeling was used to simultaneously test 
hypotheses 3a-c in a single model using maximum likelihood estimation in the lavaan 
package in R (Rosseel, 2012). All indirect effects were tested using 500 bootstrapped 
standard errors. Specifically, this model tested the hypotheses that a) realistic threat 
perceptions would predict support for anti-Muslim policies through anger, b) symbolic 
threat perception would predict support for anti-Muslim policies through distrust, and c) 
terroristic threat perceptions would predict support for anti-Muslim policies through fear 
while controlling for participant political orientation and gender. This model utilized 
observed variables rather than taking a latent approach to modeling which incorporates 
the measurement model. Although the chi-square value was significant, 𝜒2 (6) = 15.92, p 
< .05, suggesting poor fit to the data, alternative fit indices were also examined to 
determine whether the fit was adequate. Overall, the structural equation model showed 
good fit to the data (CFI = .99, SRMR = .02) based on standards suggested by Hu and 
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Bentler (1999) for a good fitting model of at least .95 for the CFI fit index and at most .08 
for the SMSR fit index. A post hoc power analysis using the semPower package in R 
(Moshagen & Erdfelder, 2016) indicated that a power level of .64 was achieved for this 
model. 
In terms of hypothesis testing, several specific hypotheses for aim 3 were 
confirmed while others were not (See Figure 13). In partial support of hypothesis 3a, 
results indicated that realistic threat perceptions predicted both anger, b = .14, SE = .06, 𝛽 
= .18, p < .05, and Muslim surveillance policy support, b = .39, SE = .07, 𝛽 = .41, p < 
.001. The indirect effect of realistic threat perceptions on Muslim surveillance policy 
support through anger, however, was not significant, b = -.01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95% 
CI [-0.03, 0.02], suggesting that while increased perceptions of realistic threats by 
Muslims predicted both anger and support for a Muslim surveillance policy, the 
relationship between realistic threat perceptions and policy support was not explained by 
feelings of anger toward Muslims. The indirect effects between realistic threat 
perceptions and Muslim surveillance policy support through distrust, b = -.002, SE = .01, 
𝛽 = -.003, ns, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.01], and fear, b = .01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .01, ns, 95% CI [-
0.02, 0.04], were also not significant.  
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In partial support of hypothesis 3b, results indicated that symbolic threat 
perceptions predicted both distrust, b = .29, SE = .07, 𝛽 = .41, p < .001, and Muslim 
surveillance policy support, b = .18, SE = .07, 𝛽 = .23, p < .05. The indirect effect of 
symbolic threat perceptions on Muslim surveillance policy support through distrust, 
however, was not significant, b = -.01, SE = .02, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.04], 
suggesting that while increased perceptions of symbolic threats by Muslims predicted 
both distrust and support for a Muslim surveillance policy, the relationship between 
symbolic threat perceptions and policy support was not explained by feelings of distrust 
toward Muslims. The indirect effects between symbolic threat perceptions and Muslim 
surveillance policy support through anger, b = -.01, SE = .02, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95% CI [-0.04, 
0.03], and fear, b = .01, SE = .02, 𝛽 = .01, ns, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.04], were also not 
significant. 
In partial support of hypothesis 3c, results indicated that terroristic threat 
perceptions predicted fear, b = .14, SE = .04, 𝛽 = .22, p < .001, but not Muslim 
surveillance policy support, b = -.01, SE = .03, 𝛽 = -.01, ns. Further, the indirect effect of 
terroristic threat perceptions on Muslim surveillance policy support through fear was not 
significant, b = .01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = .01, ns, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.03], suggesting that while 
increased perceptions of terroristic threats by Muslims predicted fear, they did not predict 
support for a Muslim surveillance policy either directly or through feelings of fear. The 
indirect effects between terroristic threat perceptions and Muslim surveillance policy 
support through anger, b = -.001, SE = .004, 𝛽 = -.002, ns, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01], and 
distrust, b = -.01, SE = .01, 𝛽 = -.01, ns, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.02], were also not significant. 
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Together, these findings leave hypothesis 3 largely unsupported. Consistent with 
the hypothesized relationships, realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions all 
directly predicted anger, distrust, and fear. Realistic and symbolic threat perceptions also 
directly predicted Muslim surveillance policy support, but terroristic threat perceptions 
did not. Further, emotional reactions toward Muslims did not mediate the relationships 
between any type of perceived threat and Muslim surveillance policy support, which was 
inconsistent with the hypotheses (see Table 8 for all direct and indirect effects). Overall, 
the full model accounted for about 56% of the variance in Muslim surveillance policy 
support (r2 = .56; see Figure 14 for all significant direct effects; see Table 9 for a 
summary of hypothesis support for all models).

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1a (SDO > Real > IS) Partially Supported
Realistic threat perceptions mediated the 
relationship between SDO and IS, but 
symbolic threat perceptions were a stronger 
mediator of this relationship
1b (RWA > Sym > IS) Fully Supported
Symbolic threat perceptions mediated the 
relationship between RWA and IS better than 
realistic or terroristic threat perceptions
1c (NAT > Terr > IS) Partially Supported
Terroristic threat perceptions mediated the 
relationship between NAT and IS, but 
symbolic and realistic threat perceptions were 
stronger mediators of this relationship
1d (Real/Sym/Terr > IS > Policy) Fully Supported
IS mediated the relationships between realistic, 
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions and 
anti-Muslim policy support
Exploratory Hypothesis (Emotion Clusters) Unsupported
Cluster analyses failed to reveal conclusive 
clusters of distinct emotional reactions
2a (Real > Anger) Partially Supported
Realistic threat perceptions predicted anger, 
but symbolic threat perceptions were a better 
predictor of anger
2b (Sym > Distrust) Fully Supported
Symbolic threat perceptions predicted distrust 
better than realistic or terroristic threat 
perceptions
2c (Terr > Fear) Partially Supported
Terroristic threat perceptions predicted fear, 
but symbolic threat perceptions were a better 
predictor of fear
3a (Real > Anger > Policy) Partially Supported
Realistic threat perceptions predicted anger and 
anti-Muslim policy support, but symbolic 
threat perceptions were a better predictor of 
anger and anger did not mediate the 
relationships between perceived threats and 
anti-Muslim policy support
3b (Sym > Distrust > Policy) Partially Supported
Symbolic threat perceptions predicted distrust 
more than realistic or terroristic threat 
perceptions and anti-Muslim policy support, 
but distrust did not mediate the relationships 
between perceived threats and anti-Muslim 
policy support
3c (Terr > Fear > Policy) Partially Supported
Terroristic threat perceptions predicted fear, 
but did not predict anti-Muslim policy support 
and fear was better predicted by symbolic 
threat perceptions but did not mediate the 
relationships between perceived threats and 
anti-Muslim policy support
Note.  Real = Realistic Threat Perceptions, Sym = Symbolic Threat Perceptions, Terr = Terroristic Threat 
Perceptions, IS = Islamophobia, NAT = Nationalism
Table 9
Summary of Hypothesis Support 




The current study elucidates the roles of several individual differences in ideology 
and threat perceptions in predicting anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support. Overall, the 
current study provides partial support for several of the hypotheses and reveals important 
insights for future research aimed at understanding threat-based emotional reactions. Aim 
1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) focused on the role of threat perceptions in driving the relationships 
between individual differences in ideology and anti-Muslim attitudes and policy, 
representing an ideology-threat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias. The results 
of the SEM for aim 1 suggest that SDO, RWA, and Nationalism simultaneously predicted 
Islamophobia through perceived realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threats. These 
increases in Islamophobic attitudes also helped to explain the relationships between each 
type of threat perception and anti-Muslim policy support, such as the Muslim ban. 
Contrary to the expectation that each ideological difference would be most related to 
conceptually similar types of threat (i.e., SDO/realistic, RWA/symbolic, 
Nationalism/terroristic), it appeared that symbolic threat perceptions were the strongest 
predictor and mediator of anti-Muslim attitudes and subsequent policy support. This 
indirect effect appears to be driven by the particularly strong relationship between 
symbolic threats and Islamophobia as the pattern of relationships between each ideology 
and each threat perception was consistent with expectations (i.e., that SDO would best 
predict realistic threats, RWA would best predict symbolic threats, and Nationalism 
would best predict terroristic threats). The indirect effects of each type of perceived threat 
did not vary substantially in size from each predictor to Islamophobia, however, making 
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it unclear how practically meaningful these differences are. Despite these unexpected 
findings, the overall pattern of results revealed that several related, but distinct individual 
differences in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism) help to explain increases in 
participants’ anti-Muslim attitudes and policy support and that they do so through several 
types of perceived threats related to resources, values, and safety.  
Aim 2 (exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c) focused on evaluating the 
emotional components of each type of threat perception, including the more recent 
addition of terroristic threat perceptions within the intergroup threat theory framework. 
Findings from aim 2 provided insights about the emotional components of perceived 
threats that will be important for future research in this area. Results of the k-means and 
hierarchical cluster analyses were inconclusive which led to the testing of hypotheses 2a-
2c as part of an a priori analysis contingency plan. Instead of utilizing emotion clusters in 
regression analyses, this contingency plan relied on existing theory which suggests that 
anger tends to be representative of realistic threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), distrust 
tends to be representative of symbolic threats (Gervais et al., 2011), and fear tends to be 
representative of terroristic threats (Lerner et al., 2003). Nine separate regression analyses 
were run with each type of perceived threat predicting each emotion in order to compare 
model fit and determine which type of threat perception best predicted anger, distrust, 
and fear. Results indicated that each type of perceived threat predicted anger, distrust, and 
fear when entered separately into a regression analysis. Symbolic threat perceptions 
accounted for the most variance in each emotion but the difference in effect sizes 
between symbolic threat perceptions and the other two types of perceived threats were 
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small. BIC comparisons also suggested that symbolic threat perceptions were the best 
predictor of anger, distrust, and fear compared to realistic and terroristic threat 
perceptions. Together, these findings suggest that there is likely overlap in which types of 
perceived threats elicit which emotional responses and possibly that symbolic threat 
perceptions are more likely to elicit various emotional responses, in general.  
Aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c) focused on evaluating the mediating roles of distinct 
emotions in the relationships between each type of perceived threat and support for 
increased surveillance of Muslims by law enforcement. Findings from aim 3 were largely 
unsupported. The SEM simultaneously examined whether threat-based emotions 
mediated the relationships between distinct types of perceived threats and anti-Muslim 
policy support. Realistic and symbolic threat perceptions directly predicted support for an 
anti-Muslim policy, but terroristic threat perceptions did not. This is somewhat consistent 
with findings from aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) that the direct effects between symbolic and 
terroristic threats and anti-Muslim policy support were not significant when accounting 
for the indirect effect of Islamophobia in these relationships. Although realistic, 
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions predicted anger, distrust, and fear, these 
emotional reactions did not mediate the relationships between perceived threats and anti-
Muslim policy support. Still, this analysis provided additional insights for future research 
beyond those of aim 2. Specifically, results showed that symbolic threat perceptions most 
strongly predicted fear, distrust, and anger while simultaneously accounting for the 
relationships between symbolic, realistic, and terroristic threat perceptions and each 
emotion. This provides further support to the notion that symbolic threat perceptions may 
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be particularly important in driving emotional reactions compared to realistic and 
terroristic threat perceptions. The nonsignificant mediating effects of emotional reactions 
in the relationships between perceived threats and policy support are somewhat 
inconsistent with previous work (e.g., Wirtz et al., 2015), however, and require further 
investigation in future studies. Possible reasons for the nonsignificant results obtained are 
discussed below. 
Implications 
 The findings of the current study contribute to our understanding of the roles of 
individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotions in prejudice and 
discrimination toward Muslims in the United States in several ways. Findings from the 
first aim suggest that differences in ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, and Nationalism) predict 
different types of perceived threats (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic) which then 
influence support for anti-Muslim policies through Islamophobia. This work builds on 
past research suggesting that SDO is a predictor of Islamophobia and that realistic, 
symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions each mediate this relationship (Uenal, 2016) 
by incorporating two other individual difference variables (i.e., RWA and Nationalism) 
that are more conceptually related to symbolic and terroristic threats, respectively. 
Despite a few deviations from expectations, these findings help to disentangle the 
independent roles of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism as predictors of Islamophobia through 
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat perceptions by simultaneously testing all of these 
relationships. Similarly, these findings point to the independent role of each type of threat 
perception as predictors of anti-Muslim policy support through Islamophobia, suggesting 
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that threat perceptions not only impact intergroup attitudes but that these intergroup 
attitudes also influence behavioral intentions. This may have important implications for 
understanding which individuals, such as those high in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism, 
will be prone to perceive Muslims as threatening and how these perceptions of threat will 
impact intergroup relations. Although longer-term, experimental designs would be 
needed to further understand the cause and effect of the established relationships, these 
findings suggest that those who are higher in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism will be more 
likely to perceive Muslims as realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threats, broadly, which 
impact Islamophobia attitudes and anti-Muslim policy support. 
Understanding which types of people are more likely to perceive certain types of 
threats holds implications for future research aimed at political messaging regarding 
active policy issues. Specifically, it may be useful to consider how the framing of policy 
initiatives differentially influences support by those who are higher in each of these 
individual differences. If proponents of policies, such as increased surveillance of 
Muslims, use stereotypes about Muslims as terrorists to justify their arguments, then 
those higher in certain ideologies, such as SDO or RWA, may be more likely to support 
these policies and politicians whose goals align with perceived threat reduction. Other 
evidence for these relationships exists with several studies pointing to RWA and SDO as 
predictors of support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election (e.g., Craig & 
Richeson, 2014b, Womick et al., 2018) as well as the mediating role perceived realistic 
threat on support for Trump and anti-immigrant policies, such as the Muslim ban (Major 
et al., 2018; Osborn et al., 2019). Despite a lack of evidence that wide-sweeping policies 
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that reduce immigration of Muslims promote national safety (Ali, 2016; Elsheikh et al., 
2017), politicians like Donald Trump have been successful at garnering support for these 
kinds of harsh policies that disproportionately impact immigrants from Muslim-majority 
countries (Trump, 2017b) by building a base of supporters who, based on the findings of 
this and other studies, are more likely to perceive certain groups as threatening to their 
resources, values, and safety. In the case of Muslims, this heightened sensitivity to 
perceived threats leads to higher levels of Islamophobia and support for anti-Muslim 
policies such as the Muslim ban. 
The second aim of the current study attempted to build on previous research that 
has explored the emotional components of realistic and symbolic threats by incorporating 
the recent addition of terroristic threats to intergroup threat theory (Obaidi et al., 2018; 
Uenal, 2016). In earlier conceptions of this theory, realistic threats encompassed both 
resource and safety threats. The current study followed research that suggests that 
resource and safety threats are conceptually different, and thus, should be investigated as 
distinct types of threat perceptions (Crawford, 2014; Uenal, 2016) and reassessed the 
emotional components of these threats under this new framework. Although the 
exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c were largely unsupported, these findings 
provide insight into how threat perceptions and emotions are related which will be 
important for future research. Specifically, symbolic threat perceptions were a better 
predictor of several distinct emotions (i.e., anger, distrust, fear) compared to realistic and 
terroristic threat perceptions. Although the differences in the effect of each type of threat 
perception on each emotion were relatively small, these findings suggest that threats to 
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one’s values may be more likely to elicit emotional responses, in general. This may be 
due to the importance of personal values in one’s social identity which value-violating 
groups may be perceived to threaten (Rios et al., 2018). Thus, perceived threats to one’s 
social identity may be tied to more emotional responses compared to threats to one’s 
resources or safety. Future research would need to directly test these possibilities, 
however.  
Finally, the third aim of this study builds on previous research investigating 
predictors of attitudes toward Muslims and support for policy initiatives that have real-
world impacts on Muslims living in the United States, such as a Muslim ban or increasing 
the surveillance of Muslims in the United States. Specifically, extending on work 
suggesting that threat perceptions influence support for discriminatory, group-based 
policies (e.g., Mukherjee et al., 2013; Rios et al., 2018; Stephan et al., 2015), the third 
aim of this study was to elucidate the role of emotions in support for anti-Muslim policies 
by investigating the mediational role of threat-based emotional reactions. Similar to 
hypotheses 2a-2c, hypotheses 3a-3c were largely unsupported and suggested the same 
pattern of findings that symbolic threat perceptions best predicted each emotional 
reaction compared to realistic and terroristic threat perceptions even when simultaneously 
estimated, lending more evidence that symbolic threat perceptions may be particularly 
important in guiding emotional reactions. Although each type of perceived threat 
predicted anger, distrust, and fear, these emotional reactions did not predict nor mediate 
the relationships between each type of perceived threat and support for increased police 
surveillance of Muslims in the United States. The findings from aims 2 and 3 are 
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inconsistent with previous work suggesting that discrete emotions predict policy support 
(Lerner et al., 2003) and mediate the relationships between perceived threat and policy 
support (Wirtz et al., 2015).  
One possibility for this inconsistency may be the general and explicit nature of the 
emotion measures used. Average ratings on each emotional reaction item were well 
below the midpoint on the scale, suggesting that most participants did not highly endorse 
experiencing these emotional reactions when thinking about Muslims, in general. 
Previous research implicating the roles of discrete emotions in support for anti-Muslim 
policies, however, have often used more contextualized measures of emotions or 
experimentally induced certain emotions (Lerner et al., 2003). Thus, it may be that asking 
participants their broad emotional reactions to a specific group that they may or may not 
regularly interact with led to the low endorsement of any specific emotion. Still, the 
findings that almost every type of perceived threat predicted anger, distrust, and fear4 
may hold implications for future research exploring the use of threat- or emotion-based 
language in policy proposals. For example, much of the language used in President 
Trump’s Muslim Ban focused on the impending threat that outside terrorists pose to 
Americans while targeting Muslim-majority countries (Trump, 2017a; Trump, 2017b). 
The use of such fear-based language and reliance on stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists 
likely influenced both other politician’s and the public’s support for this policy. Future 
research may build on these findings in order to better understand how emotionally 
 
4 Exceptions to this pattern include the nonsignificant effect of realistic threat perceptions on distrust and 
the nonsignificant effect of terroristic threat perceptions on anger. 
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charged language shifts how people think about, perceive, and subsequently support 
different policy initiatives which can have far-reaching and negative impacts.  
Applied Implications and Interventions 
 Although this work did not directly test any applied practices or interventions, the 
findings may help inform real-world applications. Given that the outcomes of interest in 
this study revolved around policies that hold implications for the policing of Muslims, 
this study may have important implications for understanding the experiences of Muslims 
with law enforcement in the United States. Research suggests that police officers have 
higher levels of certain ideologies, such as SDO (Sidanius et al., 1994), which, based on 
the findings of the current study, could influence their threat perceptions and attitudes 
toward Muslims. It is important to understand police officers’ perceptions of Muslims 
given increases in Muslim surveillance by police officers, and thus, increased contact 
between these two groups. To better understand police officers’ perceptions of Muslims 
and how this impacts policing of these communities, future research could investigate 
whether police officers higher in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism are more likely to 
perceive Muslims as threatening or endorse stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists. Such 
research could also utilize actual policing outcomes, rather than policy support, perhaps 
focusing on outcomes relevant to surveilling, such as increased contact without arrest or 
time spent monitoring areas with known mosques and Muslim community centers. This 
would allow for more insight into the impacts of attitudes and threat perceptions on actual 
Muslim surveillance by police that has resulted from policy implementation (e.g., Patriot 
Act).  
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 This research may also have implications for how policy proposals and bills are 
drafted and evaluated prior to bringing them to a vote. Given ideological differences such 
as SDO and RWA may influence susceptibility to perceive Muslims as threatening, it 
may be that politicians who are higher in these ideologies will be more likely to perceive 
Muslims as threatening which could impact how they write policy proposals and frame 
their arguments. Further, because Muslims tend to be overrepresented in media reporting 
of terrorism (Kearns et al., 2019b) and stereotyped as terrorists (Ekman, 2015), perceived 
threats of this group may be particularly problematic for policy decisions. Based on these 
considerations, one potential policy implication from the current study might be to 
employ objective, non-partisan policy proposal evaluators to assess whether the claims 
and justifications for new policies (and particularly those that could have consequential 
impacts on specific groups) are based in evidence of actual potential threats rather than 
perceptions of threats largely based in stereotypes. Such a process would allow for a 
more objective, third-party view of new issues before formally bringing them into 
political discourse and would help ensure that political issues being debated and voted on 
are based on evidence and facts as much as possible. 
Limitations and Considerations 
 As with all psychological research, important considerations when interpreting the 
findings are the social and historical contexts in which the data were collected. During 
participant recruitment, the United States and the world had been dealing with the effects 
of the COVID-19 pandemic for the better part of a year. Not only did this result in all 
participant interactions occurring online, making it hard to control for external 
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distractions while participants completed the survey, but participants may have been 
handling a number of additional life stressors brought on by the pandemic (e.g., job loss, 
illness) that may have impacted attention. An attention check item was used to remove 
participants who did not pay attention to the survey instructions to attend to this 
possibility. During this time, there was also an emphasis on the Black Lives Matter 
movement as protests erupted across the United States in response to several fatal police 
shootings involving unarmed Black people. This may have impacted the salience of the 
importance of social justice and group-based equity, especially for liberal participants 
who tend to be lower in ideological beliefs like SDO and RWA (Wilson & Sibley, 2013) 
and support more egalitarian policies (Pratto et al., 1994). Finally, data collection 
occurred during the months leading up to the 2020 presidential election involving then-
President Trump who initiated and signed the Muslim ban into effect in 2017 (Trump, 
2017b). Although controversial as a President and candidate, no known major actions or 
events specific to the Muslim ban or related issues occurred within the Trump 
administration during the time of data collection. Although it is unlikely that any of these 
social or historical factors meaningful impacted the relationships examined in the current 
study, it is important to consider the findings within this context. For example, COVID-
19 has been shown to increase perceptions of threat and intergroup intolerance in general 
(Van Bavel et al., 2020), an effect which could have generalized to participants’ 
susceptibility to perceive Muslims as threats. Similarly, it could be that the societal 
emphasis on group-based equity in policing impacted intergroup attitudes toward 
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multiple minority groups who may experience disproportionate attention and force from 
law enforcement. 
 As with any study, there are also several limitations of the current investigation. 
One limitation of the current study is the correlational nature of non-experimental survey 
data. Although SEM allows for causal inference, these techniques do not replace 
experimental manipulation or longitudinal approaches in terms of determining causality. 
Thus, in order to establish the robustness of the current study’s findings, implementing an 
experimental or longitudinal approach would be an important next step. For example, 
future work could manipulate the salience of specific types of threats by Muslims to 
determine whether priming threat perceptions systematically leads to more or less support 
of discriminatory policies for those who are high in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism 
compared to those who are low in these ideologies to better understand how different 
types of threat perceptions are related and interact.  
The nature of the measures used in this study also presents a limitation in that 
they are self-reported and explicit. As such, these measures may be susceptible to social 
desirability which appeared to be the case based on the low means for each measure. 
Although averages on each measure were similar to those from other studies using these 
measures, the fact that social desirability may have been suppressing the true level of 
each attitude presents a limitation to our ability to identify the relationships of interest.  
Explicit measures may also be inappropriate for the nature of some of the measures used, 
such as emotions, which occur in response to specific contexts or situations and often 
occur outside of our conscious awareness. This limitation hints at a larger limitation of 
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the current study design. Specifically, this study only uses explicit measures of attitudes 
and perceptions, which may paint a modest picture of the phenomena of interest. 
Specifically, because attitudes and perceptions occur at both explicit and implicit levels 
(e.g., Devine, 1989; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), measuring each emotion in an explicit 
way limits our understanding to what participants are able and willing to report. 
Participants may not be consciously aware of which emotions they feel in response to 
Muslims, making it difficult for them to report these feelings, and difficult for the current 
study to illuminate the role of these emotions in support for anti-Muslim policies. Future 
work should aim to address this limitation through the use of implicit measures of bias 
toward Muslims that are more contextually bound to a specific event or situation. Implicit 
measures could come in many forms, including video face-reading technology (e.g., 
Noldus FaceReader Software) in order to measure emotional responses to stimuli 
intended to manipulate perceived threat (e.g., Muslims vs non-Muslims in an airport 
setting). Although positive emotions were excluded from the current study due to the 
study’s focus on inherently negative types of perceived threat, this type of work would 
allow for easy inclusion of positive emotions as this technology provides continuous 
measures of positive, negative, and neutral emotions, allowing for a relative comparison 
of simultaneous positive and negative expressions. 
The last limitation of this study that is important to consider is that the measures 
of social attitudes, threat perceptions, and emotional reactions toward Muslims were not 
contextually bound, meaning that they are assessing each construct at a general level 
without a specific context. This limits our understanding of how these factors may 
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interact and influence each other in different ways depending on the situational context at 
hand. Given research that suggests that several of the variables of interest may be more or 
less important for predicting outcomes based on the context (e.g., individual differences 
in ideology, threat perceptions), exploring the influence of these factors in different 
contexts is important (e.g., Rios et al., 2018). As mentioned briefly above, emotional 
reactions are typically elicited by specific situations or stimuli, limiting the ability of the 
emotion measures used in this study to explain the broad relationships of interest. In 
thinking of the stronger impact of symbolic threats, it may be that symbolic threats are 
particularly salient for Muslims in the absence of other contextual cues. For example, it 
may be that Muslims encountered in airports will be perceived more as terroristic threats 
whereas Muslims encountered walking down the street will be perceived more as 
symbolic threats. Future work could address this limitation by orienting the situational 
context around the specific outcome variable in question. For example, if the relationship 
of interest is whether fear mediates the relationship between terroristic threat perceptions 
and increased support for police surveillance of Muslims, it may be relevant to 
manipulate terroristic threats by having some participants read about the attacks of 9/11 
before answering questions about their attitudes toward Muslims and support for anti-
Muslim policies. Focusing future research on specific contexts, rather than taking a more 
general approach as the current study did, will be helpful in better understanding the 
impact of terrorism stereotypes about Muslims that are largely driven by media on 
subsequent support for discriminatory policies that directly impact Muslims in the United 
States. 




 Future exploration of this work will include the consideration of theoretically 
plausible alternative structural equation models, particularly for aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-1d) 
which provided support for an ideology-threat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim 
bias. Although this model fits well into the intergroup threat theory framework (e.g., 
Stephen et al., 2015), this theory reflects some flexibility in the direction of relationships 
between attitudes, threat perceptions, and behaviors. First, an alternative model in which 
the direction of relationships between each type of perceived threat and Islamophobia is 
reversed (i.e., an ideology-attitude-threat-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias) will be 
tested and compared to the hypothesized model for aim 1 with the plan of identifying a 
superior model which will be transparently prepared for publication. Another potential 
avenue could be to investigate the roles of specific facets of Islamophobia on support for 
different types of anti-Muslim policies. As previously described, Islamophobia consists 
of both an anti-Muslim and anti-Islam component (Uenal, 2016). This type of distinction 
may be important in determining how Islamophobia may differentially contribute to 
support for policies that specifically target members of a religious group compared to 
those that target broader religious beliefs or a religious doctrine. For example, it may be 
that support for policies that impact individual Muslims, such as surveillance by law 
enforcement, will be most predicted by the anti-Muslim facet of Islamophobia, whereas 
support for policies aimed at reducing the influence of Islam on American society, such 
as a Muslim ban, will be most predicted by the anti-Islam facet of Islamophobia. 
Similarly, alternative models could assess whether different types of perceived threats 
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predict different types of policies (e.g., Muslim ban vs Muslim enrollment limits at 
American universities). For instance, if terroristic threats predict support for a Muslim 
ban better than symbolic threats, this may allow for more targeted intervention to break 
down stereotypes and misinformation that are relevant for terroristic threat perceptions, 
specifically. Both of these approaches would require the separation of the aggregated 
anti-Muslim policy support items used to address aim 1, however, and may not be as 
easily compared to the originally hypothesized model due to these changes in 
measurement. 
 Future research should also aim to examine the potential interactive effects of 
individual differences on the relationships between ideology, threat perceptions, and 
policy support. Although political orientation was used as a covariate in the current 
models, it may be that political ideology actually moderates the relationships between 
perceived threats and Islamophobia. The role of political orientation could be further 
explored using multigroup modeling to determine whether political orientation changes 
the pattern or strength of the mediational effects. Additionally, some research has 
suggested that ideologies such as SDO and RWA can have additive and interactive 
effects on intergroup attitudes (e.g., Wilson & Sibley, 2013), something which was not 
explored in the hypothesized models. Although the current study points to an independent 
and additive effect of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism on perceived threats and anti-Muslim 
attitudes, it could be that these ideologies also interact in various ways to change the 
nature or strength of the indirect effects of perceived threats on anti-Muslim policy 
support. Although adding several interaction terms to the already complex hypothesized 
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model may make the interpretation of the effects difficult, smaller alternative models 
could be run to investigate the interactive effects of SDO, RWA, and Nationalism on 
each type of perceived threat and anti-Muslim attitudes individually to get a fuller idea of 
the impact of multiple ideologies on anti-Muslim policy support. 
To better understand the inconclusive results of aims 2 (exploratory hypothesis 
and hypotheses 2a-2c) and 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c), alternative models that test whether the 
direction of relationships between threat perceptions and emotions should be reversed 
will also be tested. Although less theoretically conventional, it could be that emotional 
reactions are used as indicators of the type of threat perceived in a given situation (i.e., an 
emotion-threat-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias). Results will be compared to the 
hypothesized models, however, based on the low power for SEM 2, a larger sample size 
may be needed to better understand these relationships. Comparisons of alternative 
models such as those proposed above are typical in SEM due to the fact that for any good 
fitting model, there is an infinite number of equally good fitting models. It should be 
noted, however, that any alternative models showing a better fit to the data would need to 
be retested in an independent sample to avoid the possibility of capitalizing on chance 
with post hoc analyses. 
 Another area for future research lies in the measurement of actual behavioral 
outcomes (e.g., signing a petition to promote the signing of a policy into law) rather than 
the behavioral intentions used in the current study (i.e., self-reported policy support). 
Although reported support for policies should indicate the likelihood that one would 
behave in accordance with this support when presented the opportunity, it does not 
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necessarily translate to behavior, which may be influenced by several factors not 
examined here (e.g., context, norms; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Future work should aim to 
implement behavioral measures when possible. For example, one could present 
participants with a number of fictitious petitions for new laws related to Muslim 
surveillance as a measure of participant’s willingness to promote anti-Muslim policies 
through their actions. Although participants would not be signing real petitions, this could 
provide insight into the influence of individual differences in ideology, threat 
perceptions, and emotional reactions in predicting discrimination against Muslims. 
Another possibility that was previously mentioned would be to use actual policing data 
specific to the policing of Muslims. Although data between law enforcement agencies is 
not always standardized or complete, investigations could be conducted at a local or 
organizational level when data is available to allow for a deeper understanding of the 
actual impacts of identity-based policing on Muslims in the United States. 
To further disentangle the relationships between perceived threats and emotions, 
future work could utilize experimental methods to examine the impacts of priming 
different types of threats toward Muslims on subsequent emotional reactions and support 
for anti-Muslim policies. For example, by providing participants with a vignette or 
supposed headline that primes threat of a realistic (e.g., “Muslims among highest wage 
earners in the United States”), symbolic (e.g., “Americans are increasingly converting 
from Christianity to Islam”), or terroristic (e.g., “Muslim terrorist attacks on the rise in 
the United States”) nature, and then measuring their emotional responses and subsequent 
support for policies that would hinder Muslims growth and development in American 
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society, we may be able to better understand whether and how emotions impact relations 
between perceived threats and policy. Another adaptation that could be implemented in 
future work would be to measure emotions on a more implicit level (e.g., through face 
reading technology) to better assess discrete emotional responses to differences in 
perceived threat. Utilizing technology aimed at assessing smaller and less controllable 
expressions of emotional change may be particularly beneficial to addressing the 
potential for social desirability in intergroup bias research. 
 A final area for future research could be to explore how these effects translate to 
prejudice toward other groups and subsequent policy support. Given that the scope of this 
research was to investigate how different ideologies and perceptions influence policies 
that specifically impact Muslims, it is unclear whether these mechanisms are unique to 
Muslims or whether these effects would be stronger toward Muslims than other groups. 
Moving forward, it would be beneficial to explore how the mechanisms of individual 
differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and emotions function for other religious or 
ethnic groups. Future research should investigate how individual differences in SDO, 
RWA, and Nationalism impact perceptions of threat toward multiple religious and ethnic 
groups, such as Jewish people or non-Muslim Middle Easterners. This would provide 
insight on how generalizable the mechanisms examined in the current study are for other 
groups of people and other types of policy support.  
Conclusion 
The current study contributes to our understanding of the simultaneous roles of 
individual differences in ideology, threat perceptions, anti-Muslim attitudes, and 
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emotions in support for anti-Muslim policies in the United States. Aim 1 (hypotheses 1a-
1d) evaluated an ideology-threat-attitude-behavior model of anti-Muslim bias that 
simultaneously investigated the roles of ideology (i.e., SDO, RWA, Nationalism), threat 
perceptions (i.e., realistic, symbolic, terroristic), and Islamophobia in predicting anti-
Muslim policy support. Findings suggested that each of these ideologies simultaneously 
predict each type of perceived threat which then mediates the relationships between 
ideology and Islamophobia and subsequent anti-Muslim policy support, with symbolic 
threat perceptions having the largest effects on these relationships. This research sheds 
light on the individual differences in threat perceptions, and thus, the types of people who 
may be more attuned to different types of threats. This study also provided some 
considerations for future research regarding the emotional components of each threat 
perception. Aim 2 (exploratory hypothesis and hypotheses 2a-2c) evaluated the emotional 
components of perceived threats and provided important insights for future research 
regarding the overlap in emotional representations of each type of perceived threat as 
well as the importance of symbolic threat perceptions in eliciting various discrete 
emotions. Aim 3 (hypotheses 3a-3c) evaluated the mediating roles of distinct emotions in 
the relationships between different types of perceived threats and support for increased 
surveillance of Muslims by law enforcement. Although expectations regarding the 
mediations were unsupported, findings provided additional information for future 
research that extends on those from aim 2. That is, just as symbolic threat perceptions 
appeared to be the best predictor of each type of emotion when tested separately, this 
pattern held when simultaneously accounting for the relationships between each type of 
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perceived threat and each discrete emotional reaction. Altogether, this study suggests that 
those higher in SDO, RWA, and Nationalism are more likely to perceive Muslims as 
realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threats which increase their feelings of Islamophobia 
and support for anti-Muslim policies. This has implications for who may be more or less 
likely to vote against the interests of Muslims in the United States and guides future work 
exploring how to minimize reliance on perceived threat and emotional reactions in policy 
decisions. Further, this study points to the importance of symbolic threat perceptions in 
mediating the relationships between each ideological difference and anti-Muslim 
attitudes and policy support which may suggest that –at least in the absence of other 
contextual cues—symbolic threat perceptions of Muslims are particularly important for 
predicting Islamophobia, negative emotions, and anti-Muslim policy support. Although 
the roles of emotions in the relationships between perceived threats and anti-Muslim 
policy support were less clear in the current study, this work helps to inform future 
research interested in the emotional components of threat perceptions of Muslims by also 
pointing to the importance of symbolic threats for negative emotional reactions toward 
Muslims. Ultimately, this study supports much of the existing literature on individual 
differences in ideology, threat perceptions, and anti-Muslim attitudes while providing 
several compelling areas of future research.  
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Appendix: Survey Materials 
1. Age 
a. What is your age? __________ 
2. Urbanicity 




iv. Other (Please specify: __________) 
3. State of Residence 
a. What state do you currently reside in? _______________________ 
4. Socioeconomic Status (SES) 
a. Please estimate your socioeconomic status. 
i. Very high 
ii. High 
iii. Somewhat high 
iv. Average 
v. Somewhat low 
vi. Low 
vii. Very low 
5. Profession/Occupation 
a. What is your current profession/occupation? _______________________ 
6. Education Level 
a. What is your highest level of education? 
i. Less than high school degree 
ii. High school graduate 
iii. Some college 
iv. Bachelor’s degree 
v. Graduate or professional degree 
7. Race/Ethnicity 
a. With which racial/ethnic group do you identify? 
i. White, European 
ii. Black, African 
iii. Native American, First Nations 
iv. Latino/a/x 
v. East, South, or Southeast Asian 
vi. Middle Eastern, Arab 
vii. Hawaiian Native, Pacific Islander 
viii. Multiracial (Please specify :_________) 
ix. Not listed (Please specify :_________) 









iv. Not listed (Please specify :_________) 




9. U.S. Native 
a. Were you born in the United States? 
i. Yes 
ii. No (if no: how many years have you lived in the US: _________) 
10. Political Ideology 
a. Which of the following best represents your political views? 
i. Very conservative 
ii. Conservative 
iii. Slightly conservative 
iv. Neither liberal or conservative (please specify:_____________) 
v. Slightly liberal 
vi. Liberal 
vii. Very liberal 
11. Religious Identification 









ix. None/No religious affiliation 
x. Not listed (Please specify :_________) 
12. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO7; Ho et al., 2015).  
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below. You can 
work quickly; your first feeling is generally best: 1 (strongly disagree) - 7 
(strongly agree). R = reverse scored. 
i. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be 
on the bottom.  
ii. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
MUSLIM THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY 
 
135 
iii. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. R 
iv. No one group should dominate in society. R 
v. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
vi. Group equality should not be our primary goal.  
vii. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. R 
viii. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different 
groups. R 
13. Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Manganelli Rattazzi et al., 2007)  
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). R = reverse scored. 
i. Authoritarian aggression and submission subscale: 
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do 
what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and 
sinfulness that are ruining us. 
2. The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in 
government and religion only create useless doubts in 
people’s minds. 
3. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the 
strongest method would be justified if they eliminated 
troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 
4. What our country really needs instead of more “civil 
rights” is a good stiff dose of law and order. 
5. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important 
values children should learn. 
6. The fact on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public 
disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant 
groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral 
standards and preserve law and order. 
7. What our country needs most is disciplined citizens, 
following national leaders in unity. 
ii. Conservatism subscale: 
1. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the 
established religions are no doubt every bit as good and 
virtuous as those who attend church regularly. R 
2. A lot of our rules regarding sexual behavior are just 
customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than 
those which other people follow. R 
3. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. R 
4. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being 
brave enough to defy “traditional family values.” R 
5. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, 
and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different 
from everyone else. R 
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6. People should pay less attention to the Church and the 
Pope, and instead develop their own personal standards of 
what is moral and immoral. R 
7. It is good that nowadays young people have greater 
freedom ‘‘to make their own rules’’ and to protest against 
things they don’t like. R 
14. Nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989)  
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). 
i. In view of America's moral and material superiority, it is only right 
that we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations 
policy. 
ii. The first duty of every young American is to honor the national 
American history and heritage. 
iii. The important thing for the U.S. foreign aid program is to see to it 
that the U.S. gains a political advantage. 
iv. Other countries should try to make their government as much like 
ours as possible. 
v. Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the 
better off they are. 
vi. Foreign nations have done some very fine things, but it takes 
America to do things in a big way. 
vii. It is important that the U.S. win in international sporting 
competitions like the Olympics. 
viii. It is really not important that the U.S. be number one in whatever it 
does. R 
15. Threat perceptions (adapted from Uenal, 2016)  
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). 
i. Realistic Threat: 
1. The presence of Islam in the United States threatens our 
economic prosperity.  
2. Because of the presence of Islam, the education system in 
the United States is threatened. 
3. Because of the presence of Muslims in the United States, 
Americans have more difficulties finding a job. 
4. Because of the presence of Muslims in the United States, 
Americans have more difficulties finding housing. 
ii. Symbolic Threat: 
1. I am worried that the Western culture is endangered by 
Islam. 
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2. I am worried that the Christian norms and values are 
threatened by Islam. 
3. I am worried that the American norms and values are 
threatened by the presence of Muslims. 
4. I am worried that our rights and freedom are threatened by 
the presence of Muslims. 
iii. Terroristic Threat: 
1. I am worried that peace is threatened by radical Islamist 
groups in the United States. 
2. It is only a matter of time before the United States will 
become a target for Islamist terrorists. 
3. Sometimes I think I could become a victim of an Islamist 
terrorist attack myself. 
16. Islamophobia (Lee et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013)  
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). 
i. I would support any policy that would stop the building of new 
mosques (Muslim place of worship) in the U.S. 
ii. If possible, I would avoid going to places where Muslims would 
be. 
iii. I would become extremely uncomfortable speaking with a Muslim. 
iv. Just to be safe, it is important to stay away from places where 
Muslims could be. 
v. I dread the thought of having a professor that is Muslim. 
vi. If I could, I would avoid contact with Muslims. 
vii. If I could, I would live in a place where there were no Muslims. 
viii. Muslims should not be allowed to work in places where many 
Americans gather such as airports. 
ix. Islam is a dangerous religion. 
x. The religion of Islam supports acts of violence.  
xi. Islam supports terrorist acts. 
xii. Islam is anti-American.  
xiii. Islam is an evil religion. 
xiv. Islam is a religion of hate. 
xv. I believe that Muslims support the killings of all non-Muslims.  
xvi. Muslims want to take over the world. 
17. Emotional reactions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005)  
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 5 on the scale below: 1 (not at all) - 
7 (extremely). 
i. When I think about Muslims I feel… 
1. Fear 
2. Anger 









18. Policy Support (Items 1 and 2 self-created; item 3 from Nobles & Nobles, 
1954, as cited in Andersen, Brinson, & Stohl, 2012) 
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). 
i. I would support a policy to require government surveillance of all 
U.S. mosques. 
ii. I would support the banning of all Muslims into the United States. 
iii. I would support state universities limiting enrollment by members 
of racial and religious groups in proportion to their percentage of 
the state’s population. 
19. Summary of “Proposed” Muslim Surveillance Program in United States 
a. A Senate bill which calls for increased police surveillance of Muslims was 
recently scheduled for a vote. The Surveillance for Public Safety Act (S.B. 
5483) would enable increased police surveillance of Muslims and their 
communities in the United States with the goal of preventing domestic 
terrorism. If passed, this bill would then go to a conference committee for 
final approval before being sent to the President for signing. If signed by 
the President, this law would allow police officers and law enforcement 
agencies to stop and request information from individuals seen leaving a 
mosque or Islamic community center regarding their identity, reason for 
visiting the mosque or community center, and other pertinent information 
that law enforcement officials deem useful in preventing terrorism in the 
United States as long as they have reasonable suspicion. Supporters of this 
bill cite the importance of understanding who is visiting mosques and why 
in relation to the war on terror in the United States. Providing police 
officers this extra allowance to question those visiting mosques aids in this 
effort. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that “reasonable suspicion” is 
vague and allows for undue questioning of those who are practicing their 
religious freedoms in the United States. 
20. Support for “Proposed” Muslim Surveillance Program in United States 
a. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement 
below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below: 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). 
i. I would support the decision to pass this bill to increase police 
surveillance of Muslim communities and mosques. 
ii. Having increased police surveillance of Muslim communities and 
mosques through this bill would reduce crime in the United States. 
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iii. The passing of this bill would make the United States safer. 
iv. The passing of this bill would increase racial profiling in the 
United States. R 
v. The passing of this bill would increase religious profiling in the 
United States. R 
vi. Increasing Muslim surveillance through this bill would have a 
negative impact on Muslim-police interactions. R 
vii. Passing this bill would have a negative impact on the lives of 
Muslims in the United States. R 
